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QUIET-REVOLUTION RULINGS 
IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
DAN T. COENEN 
ABSTRACT 
The Supreme Court ordinarily supports its establishment of major 
constitutional principles with detailed justifications in its opinions. On occasion, 
however, the Court proceeds in a very different way, issuing landmark 
pronouncements without giving any supportive reasons at all. This Article 
documents the recurring character and deep importance of these “quiet-
revolution rulings” in constitutional law. It shows that—however surprising it 
might seem—rulings of this sort have played key roles in shaping incorporation; 
reverse incorporation; congressional power; federal courts; and freedom-of-
speech, freedom-of-religion, and equal-protection law. According to the 
synthesis offered here, these rulings fall into two categories. One set of cases 
involves “ipse dixit declarations,” which establish major hornbook-type 
principles even while offering no reasons on their behalf. In the other group of 
cases—characterized here as “invitational pronouncements”—the Court does 
not establish discrete constitutional doctrines but instead deploys rhetoric that 
sets the stage for transformative future developments. This Article explores the 
nature and justifiability of quiet-revolution rulings. It posits that recent 
developments may well steer the Court away from the future issuance of 
decisions of this kind. Such a result will appeal to observers who view the law 
as centered on careful reason-giving. Even so, it may be that the issuance of 
quiet-revolution rulings sometimes makes good sense. Especially for analysts 
drawn to common-law constitutionalism, invitational pronouncements may hold 
value because they signal possible pathways for developing the law over time. 
In unusual cases, ipse dixit declarations may do helpful work, too. In particular, 
the Court sometimes faces the unwelcome prospect of deciding a case through 
the issuance of a confusing mix of plurality opinions. In these instances, the 
option of issuing an ipse dixit declaration may allow a majority of the Court to 
come together in a single opinion, thus allowing it to bring needed clarity to the 
law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Some Supreme Court rulings make a grand entrance. Marbury v. Madison,1 
McCulloch v. Maryland,2 and Miranda v. Arizona3 illustrate the point. In each 
of these cases, the Court launched a transformative constitutional principle in a 
setting marked by white-hot public debate. Oftentimes, high-profile decisions 
build on high-profile decisions that came before. Brown v. Board of Education4 
drew on Sweatt v. Painter.5 Roe v. Wade6 pointed to the earlier Griswold v. 
Connecticut7 and Eisenstadt v. Baird8 decisions. The Court’s same-sex-marriage 
ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges9 found support in Romer v. Evans,10 Lawrence v. 
Texas,11 and United States v. Windsor.12 With these pronouncements, too, 
visibility was high, and the effort to establish new doctrine met stiff resistance. 
Citizens took notice. Interest groups took sides. The media editorialized. 
Opinion leaders railed. Other opinion leaders railed right back. 
Sometimes the legal community, more so than the larger political community, 
takes on the task of monitoring the Supreme Court’s work. With regard to Craig 
v. Boren,13 for example, ordinary citizens likely had little interest in the nuances 
of state “near beer” regulation, but a majority of the Court used the case both to 
articulate and to justify a new “intermediate scrutiny” test for laws that treat 
women and men differently.14 In response, then-Associate Justice Rehnquist 
 
1 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (announcing power of judicial review). 
2 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 426 (1819) (rejecting narrow view of Necessary and Proper 
Clause in upholding Congress’s creation of national bank and rejecting state authority to tax 
operation of federal instrumentalities). 
3 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (setting forth rules regarding officer warnings to be given to 
persons in custody to ensure meaningful protection of right against self-incrimination). 
4 347 U.S. 483, 493-95 (1954) ( rejecting “separate but equal” doctrine in context of public 
education). 
5 339 U.S. 629, 633 (1950) (finding no “substantial equality in the educational 
opportunities offered” white and black law students by state). 
6 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (invalidating state prohibitions of abortion). 
7 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (invalidating state ban on contraceptive use by married 
couples). 
8 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972) (invalidating state ban on contraceptive use by unmarried, as 
well as married, persons). 
9 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015). 
10  517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996) (invalidating state constitutional ban on extending 
antidiscrimination laws to homosexuals). 
11  539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (invalidating criminal sodomy laws as applied to consenting 
partners in private places and noncommerical contexts). 
12  570 U.S. 744, 763-64 (2013) (invalidating portions of federal Defense of Marriage Act 
as applied to disadvantage same-sex married couples). 
13  429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
14 See id. at 197 (stating that “classifications by gender must serve important governmental 
objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives”). 
  
2064 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:2061 
 
penned a vigorous dissent,15 and the importance of the ruling was hardly lost on 
lawyers and legal academics.16 Many cases fit the mold of Craig. The majority 
reasons its way to embracing a new legal principle in the face of objections set 
forth in a dissenting opinion. Constitutional analysts line up on one side or the 
other. The law takes shape in a crucible of robust disagreement within the legal 
profession.  
Cases such as Marbury, Brown, and Craig—and less famous rulings that 
share their focus on thoughtful justification—dominate thinking about the 
Court’s work. These are the cases that fill the pages of constitutional law 
casebooks, in part because the very elaborateness of their reasoning makes them 
lengthy in character. These decisions combine the announcement of major 
principles with conscientious exercises of the lawyerly craft, which in turn 
trigger reactions—often expressed in dissenting opinions—likewise rooted in 
reason-giving. These rulings conform to lawyerly notions about how law is done 
in part because lawyerly training and lawyerly work center on reasoned analysis.  
Sometimes, however, the Court issues rulings of a very different kind. In these 
cases, the Court does not exercise the lawyerly craft. Instead, the Court lays 
down major doctrines without offering reasons on their behalf. New principles 
thus do not enter the law by earning victory in pitched battles. Instead, they 
capture ground—often sprawling ground—without the support of any analysis 
at all. This Article considers this set of “quiet-revolution rulings.” In four parts, 
it documents and explores the significance of this important, but little-noticed, 
feature of the Supreme Court’s constitutional work. 
Part I offers examples of quiet-revolution rulings. An illustration is provided 
by Schenck v. United States,17 the First Amendment case that initially set forth 
the rhetoric of “clear and present danger.”18 In Schenck itself, Justice Holmes 
used the phrase almost in passing, without stirring even a hint of objection from 
any other Justice. In dozens of later cases, however, the Court drew on this 
pronouncement to push First Amendment law in a strongly libertarian direction. 
As a result, a quiet revolution took place, and it took place because an action of 
the Court that went largely unnoticed at the time later played a major role in the 
remolding of constitutional doctrine.19 This Article shows that similar 
 
15 See id. at 217-20 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
16  See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst, The Supreme Court, 1976 Term—Foreword: Equal 
Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 54 (1977) (reflecting on 
Craig and noting that it might mark “beginning of a candid acknowledgement by the Supreme 
Court that it uses a variable standard of judicial review”). 
17  249 U.S. 47 (1919). 
18 See id. at 52 (“The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such 
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will 
bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent.”). 
19 For a more detailed treatment of Schenck, see infra notes 186-203 and accompanying 
text. 
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developments mark almost all areas of constitutional law. From incorporation to 
reverse incorporation, from means-ends analysis to the law of federal courts, 
from equal-protection limits to commerce-power doctrine—in all these areas, 
quiet legal revolutions have radically reshaped the legal landscape. 
Part II offers the beginnings of a systematic analysis of this body of decisions. 
It suggests that quiet-revolution rulings come in two main forms: invitational 
pronouncements and ipse dixit declarations. Invitational pronouncements—well 
exemplified by the “clear and present danger” rhetoric of Schenck20—summon 
up the image of the planted seed. In this set of cases, whether consciously or not, 
the Court works into its analysis, in an unheralded way, open-textured rhetoric 
that holds the later-realized potential to support judicial innovation. In contrast, 
ipse dixit declarations themselves set forth concrete, newly operative, hornbook-
proposition doctrines. These doctrines, however, come into the law by way of 
opinions that differ fundamentally from the thoughtfully reasoned rulings 
handed down in cases such as Marbury, Brown, and Craig. Instead of offering 
careful justifications, the ipse dixit ruling declares a new constitutional doctrine 
in a one-sentence or “all but nothing more” pronouncement, thus failing to signal 
that any serious change (far less a sea change) in the law has occurred. The 
Court’s rulings that asserted, with no explanation whatsoever, that the 
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause incorporates the Free Speech, Free 
Press, Free Exercise, and Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment 
provide examples.21  
Parts III and IV address two big-picture questions brought into focus by the 
descriptive account offered in Parts I and II: First, will the Court continue to 
issue quiet-revolution rulings? Second, should it? As to the former question, 
recent decades have produced sweeping changes in our legal culture, including 
as a result of internet communications, growing political polarization and a 
widening attentiveness among the general public to the Supreme Court’s work.22 
Part III suggests that these forces are likely to push the Justices away from the 
future issuance of ipse dixit declarations and perhaps, although to a lesser extent, 
from invitational pronouncements as well. With regard to the latter question, 
Part IV makes the case that the normative justifiability of quiet-revolution 
rulings will hinge, to a large extent, on the underlying theory of interpretation 
that constitutional analysts bring to their work. For originalists, both ipse dixit 
declarations and invitational pronouncements raise profound concerns because 
unreasoned rulings of any kind stand in tension with an interpretive approach 
built at its core on the giving of reasons rooted in historical understandings.23 
So-called “living constitutionalists” may approach these matters with a greater 
 
20  See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text. 
21  See generally infra notes 44-64 and accompanying text. 
22 See infra notes 333-338 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra Section IV.A. 
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measure of flexibility.24 Even so, these analysts tend to gravitate to the common-
law method of decision-making, which also emphasizes the importance of 
reason-giving, and thus they too will likely view ipse dixit pronouncements with 
skepticism as a general matter.25 At the same time, nonoriginalist analysts may 
well be more likely than originalists to find quiet-revolution rulings justifiable 
in two respects. First, nonoriginalist analysts may endorse ipse dixit declarations 
in exceptional cases, especially when fragmentation within the Court threatens 
efforts to produce intelligible majority opinions. Second, nonoriginalist analysts 
may well look favorably on invitational pronouncements on the theory that those 
pronouncements comport with the incremental unfolding of constitutional law 
over time, in keeping with the common-law method. 
In the end, far-reaching uncertainty overhangs the future prospects of quiet-
revolution constitutional rulings. One thing, however, is not uncertain at all: 
These rulings have played a critical role in the past development of constitutional 
law, including by giving rise to many of the most consequential judicial rulings 
in American history.26 And when it turns out that an identifiable group of 
Supreme Court rulings has dramatically altered our constitutional regime in 
ways that went wholly unexplained when those decisions came down, it seems 
sensible to examine closely what has been happening. In addition, precisely 
because quiet-revolution rulings often have gained acceptance in the past, there 
is every reason to expect that the Court will find itself contemplating the 
possibility of issuing such rulings in the future. That likelihood suggests, in turn, 
the wisdom of subjecting this set of rulings to a critical examination. 
Many legal academics—precisely because of their reason-steeped lawyerly 
training and outlook—will be quick to decry rulings of this kind due to their 
conclusory and “under the table” nature. Such a reaction, however, may be 
mistaken if, as Holmes observed, “[t]he life of the law has not been logic: it has 
been experience.”27 The recurring character of quiet-revolution rulings, coupled 
with their transformational effects, suggests the importance of looking hard at 
their origins, their operation, and their justifiability. Such a descriptive and 
evaluative examination is offered here.  
I. AN OVERVIEW OF KEY QUIET-REVOLUTION RULINGS 
Quiet-revolution rulings have done heavy lifting in diverse fields of 
constitutional decision-making. Their impact has been great, for example, with 
regard to the law of incorporation, reverse incorporation, free speech, equal 
protection, congressional powers, federal court jurisdiction, and means-ends 
 
24 See generally infra notes 367-375 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra Section IV.B. 
26 Among those cases are Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Gitlow v. New York, 268 
U.S. 652 (1925); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); and Santa Clara County v. 
Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886), all of which are discussed below. 
27  Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law (1881), reprinted in THE FUNDAMENTAL 
HOLMES: A FREE SPEECH CHRONICLE AND READER 60 (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., 2010). 
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analysis as it has operated to define the scope of almost all constitutional rights. 
These and other examples, which are documented in detail below, make it clear 
that quiet-revolution rulings have shaped constitutional doctrine in far-reaching 
ways. 
A. Incorporation 
Few developments in constitutional law have had greater practical 
significance than the Court’s invocation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause to apply to the states nearly all of the protections set forth in the 
Bill of Rights. Yet the Court’s long journey to this endpoint has been marked by 
a series of quiet-revolution rulings. And of particular importance has been the 
Court’s full-scale incorporation of each of the protections set forth in the First 
Amendment. 
1. Incorporating the Free Speech and Free Press Clauses 
It is a curiosity of constitutional history that the Court did no serious work 
with the First Amendment’s Free Speech and Free Press Clauses for more than 
one hundred twenty years following that Amendment’s ratification. This period 
of quiescence came to a halt as the government moved to jail activists who 
opposed the nation’s military policies during World War I. Key rulings included 
Schenck,28 as well as Frohwerk v. United States,29 Debs v. United States,30 and 
Abrams v. United States.31 Each of these cases involved a challenge to a federal 
statute, so that the First Amendment clearly applied regardless of the dictates of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. One question these decisions brought into view, 
however, was clear enough: What would happen when state officials took aim 
at antigovernment agitators? 
They soon did. The earliest prosecutions stemmed from growing alarm about 
the Bolshevik Revolution, rising worker movements in America, and the 
resulting enactment of state criminal syndicalism laws. The Supreme Court’s 
first brush with these proscriptions came in Gitlow v. New York,32 in which 
Justice Sanford began his analysis by observing that: 
For present purposes, we may and do assume that freedom of speech and 
of the press—which are protected by the First Amendment from 
abridgment by Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights and 
 
28  See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text (discussing introduction of “clear and 
present danger” to First Amendment lexicon). 
29  249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919) (upholding conviction for conspiracy to violate Espionage Act 
of 1917 based on antiwar tracts contained in circulated newspapers). 
30  249 U.S. 211, 215 (1919) (upholding conviction under Espionage Act of 1917 for 
delivery of antiwar speech). 
31  250 U.S. 616, 619 (1919) (upholding conviction under Espionage Act of 1917 for 
printing and distributing circulars focused on criticizing American military action in Russia). 
32  268 U.S. 652 (1925). 
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“liberties” protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment from impairment by the States.33 
The Court went on to consider the merits of the defendant’s constitutional 
claim and found it unavailing.34 Notably, the Court in Gitlow did not agonize 
over—indeed, it did not discuss at all—whether it made sense to read into the 
state-limiting Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause the substantive 
protections of liberty directed against the national government by the First 
Amendment.35 The Court did not agonize because it did not have to agonize. 
Given its ruling against the defendant on the merits, it made perfect sense for the 
Justices to do just what they did—that is, to “assume,” and only to “assume,” 
that the operative protections set forth in the First Amendment applied in 
Gitlow’s case.  
As things turned out, however, Gitlow spawned a quiet constitutional 
revolution. In later rulings that involved state—not federal—prosecutions, the 
Court applied the limiting principles of the Free Speech and Free Press Clauses 
without hesitation. Illustrative is Stromberg v. California.36 There, as if 
forgetting that the Court only had to “assume” the point in Gitlow, Chief Justice 
Hughes asserted for the majority without equivocation: “It has been determined 
that the conception of liberty under the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment embraces the right of free speech.”37 Thereafter, in Schneider v. 
 
33  Id. at 666. The Court added: “We do not regard the incidental statement in Prudential 
Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543, that the Fourteenth Amendment imposes no restrictions 
on the States concerning freedom of speech, as determinative of this question.” Id. In practical 
effect, the Court thus displaced one quiet-revolution ruling, handed down only three years 
earlier, with another by repudiating, without any explanation, an earlier ipse dixit declaration 
made in a similarly “incidental” way. 
34 See id. at 664-65 (finding statute and conviction constitutional because legislature 
validly targeted “words [that] imply urging to action” even though no actual incitement 
occurred). 
35 See id. at 666; see also Patterson v. Colorado ex rel. Attorney Gen., 205 U.S. 454, 462 
(1907) (“We leave undecided the question whether there is to be found in the Fourteenth 
Amendment a prohibition similar to that in the First.”). 
36  283 U.S. 359 (1931). 
37  Id. In support of this proposition, the Court cited Gitlow, together with Whitney v. 
California, 274 U.S. 357, 368 (1927) and Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927). Just as in 
Gitlow, however, the majority in Whitney did not discuss the question whether the protections 
put in place by the Free Speech Clause apply or should apply to the states; rather, and again 
as in Gitlow, the Court merely concluded that the case provided no basis for endorsing the 
free-speech-based claim of liberty advanced by the defendant. 274 U.S. at 368. In Fiske, a 
unanimous Court did overturn a conviction obtained under a state syndicalism statute. In 
doing so, however, the Court simply distinguished Gitlow and Whitney on their facts without 
even mentioning the underlying incorporation question and leaving some room for readers to 
view the case as rooted less in the First Amendment than in traditional due-process 
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New Jersey,38 the Court pointed to Gitlow in clarifying that this principle reached 
the Free Press Clause as well.39 Again, the pronouncement of the Court was as 
categorical as it was unreasoned. The Justices simply proclaimed that “[t]he 
freedom of speech and of the press secured by the First Amendment against 
abridgment by the United States is similarly secured to all persons by the 
Fourteenth against abridgment by a state.”40 These rulings left no doubt about 
the revolutionary impact of Gitlow, at least when viewed in hindsight. As the 
Court in Bridges v. California41 explained: “Not until 1925, with the decision in 
Gitlow v. New York, did this Court recognize in the Fourteenth Amendment the 
application to the states of the same standards of freedom of expression as, under 
the First Amendment, are applicable to the federal government.”42  
2. Incorporating the Religion Clauses 
The quiet Fourteenth Amendment revolution launched by Gitlow did not stop 
with the “standards of freedom of expression” referenced in Bridges.43 By 1940, 
the Court was prepared to declare that the fundamental concept of liberty 
embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment embraced all “the liberties guaranteed 
by the First Amendment,”44 including its safeguards of religious freedom. As 
the Court put the point in Cantwell v. Connecticut45: “The First Amendment 
declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has 
 
constraints. See Fiske, 274 U.S. at 386-87 (assailing conviction of defendant “without any 
charge or evidence” of a necessary element of the crime). 
38  308 U.S. 147 (1939). 
39  Id. at 160. 
40  Id. In Schneider, the Court supplemented its citation to Gitlow (as well as to Stromberg) 
with additional citations to Whitney, see supra note 37, as well as Grosjean v. American Press 
Co., 297 U.S. 233, 239 (1936); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937); Herndon v. 
Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 255 (1937); and Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 450 (1938). See 
Schneider, 308 U.S. at 160 n.8, 161 n.9. But these cases, too, involved at most conclusory 
pronouncements. Grosjean, for example, merely cited Gitlow as having established the 
“fundamental character” of expressive freedoms. See Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 244 (citing 
Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 666). In like fashion, De Jonge tersely described speech and press rights 
as “fundamental,” citing Gitlow together with follow-on rulings, including Stromberg and 
Grosjean. See De Jonge, 299 U.S. at 364 (“Freedom of speech and of the press are 
fundamental rights which are safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the Federal Constitution.” (first citing Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 666; then citing 
Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 368; then citing Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 707 
(1931); and then citing Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 243-44)). 
41 314 U.S. 252 (1941). 
42  Id. at 267-68 (citation omitted). 
43  Id. at 268. 
44  Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
45 310 U.S. 296 (1940). 
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rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such 
laws.”46 This declaration—reaching well past the Free Speech and Free Press 
Clauses to incorporate both the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment 
Clause—again came in a quiet revolution. The first Justice Roberts offered not 
one word of explanation for the Court’s pronouncement, even though it 
massively contracted state autonomy in the service of safeguarding religious 
liberty. Of particular importance, he did not address the specialized argument as 
to why the Fourteenth Amendment should not incorporate the Establishment 
Clause even if the Amendment broadly incorporates other Bill of Rights 
protections.47 Instead, Justice Roberts supported his eighteen-word treatment of 
how the Fourteenth Amendment assimilated both religion clauses by pointing 
only to the Court’s earlier free-expression ruling in Schneider.48 And that case’s 
ruling—as we have seen—rested in essence only on the assumption made by the 
Court in Gitlow about speech and press rights.49  
 
46  Id. at 303. 
47  See, e.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 50 (2004) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (rejecting incorporation of Establishment Clause because it “is best understood 
as a federalism provision [that] does not protect any individual right”); Akhil Reed Amar, 
Some Notes on the Establishment Clause, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1, 3 (1996) (“[T]he 
nature of the states’ establishment clause right against federal disestablishment makes it quite 
awkward to mechanically ‘incorporate’ the clause against the states via the Fourteenth 
Amendment. . . . [T]o apply the clause against a state government is precisely to eliminate its 
right to choose whether to establish a religion—a right explicitly confirmed by the 
Establishment Clause itself!”). 
48  See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303 (“The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the 
Fourteenth] Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment.” (citing 
Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939))). 
49 See supra notes 38-40 and accompanying text. One step on the way to the Court’s 
declaration in Cantwell came in Palko v. Connecticut, in which the Court noted that “the due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment may make it unlawful for a state to 
abridge . . . the free exercise of religion.” 302 U.S. 319, 324 (1937), overruled in part by 
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). To say the least, this statement about what the Due 
Process Clause “may” do was not determinative (if even informative) as to the issue presented 
in Cantwell. This is all the more true because the Court in Palko could muster only one citation 
in support of this proposition. See id. (citing Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 
U.S. 245, 262 (1934)). In that cited case, however, the Court had done nothing more than 
reject a student’s claim that the Due Process Clause should free him from a state rule requiring 
enrollment in a military training class, noting in doing so only that “the ‘liberty’ protected by 
the due process clause . . . does include the right to entertain the beliefs, to adhere to the 
principles and to teach the doctrines on which these students base their objections . . . .” 
Hamilton, 293 U.S. at 262. Whatever else this passage might have established, it did not say 
that the Free Exercise Clause, far less the Establishment Clause, is incorporated into the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See id. 
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3. The Revolutionary Character of the Gitlow Line of Cases 
From a present-day perspective, Gitlow and its progeny may seem more 
prosaic than transformative. After all, the all-but-complete incorporation of the 
Bill of Rights—borne largely of the labors of Justice Hugo Black—is now a 
well-accepted feature of constitutional doctrine. When Gitlow was decided in 
1919, however, the law was in a very different place. Hugo Black was a young, 
practicing lawyer just returning from service in World War I and was still nearly 
two decades away from appointment to the Court. Indeed, the confident 
brusqueness with which the incorporation principles launched in Gitlow found 
expression in later cases was especially surprising because, in earlier decisions, 
the Court had taken a highly cautious approach to applying Bill of Rights 
protections to the states. In 1876, for example, it signaled that the Second 
Amendment did not constrain state action.50 In other rulings, the Court refused 
to read into the Due Process Clause even long-celebrated procedural safeguards, 
deeming neither the Fifth Amendment’s requirement of grand jury indictment51 
nor its protection against self-incrimination applicable to state authorities.52 
Most important of all, only three years before Gitlow, the Court had gone so far 
as to reject the very principle that Gitlow itself came to embody, stating without 
qualification that “neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor any other provision 
of the Constitution of the United States imposes upon the States any restrictions 
about ‘freedom of speech.’”53 To be sure, that pronouncement itself came in an 
unreasoned, one-line proclamation. But its preexisting, and very recent, 
appearance in the work of the Court puts into bold relief the law-transforming 
character of the no-less-conclusory line of rulings that began with Gitlow. 
The revolutionary impact of these rulings cannot be overstated because, since 
World War I, most legal challenges founded on the First Amendment have taken 
aim at state and local action. As a result, the Court’s most consequential rulings 
in this area have arisen out of laws and practices not involving the federal 
government at all—in cases addressing public-official defamation,54 flag 
 
50  See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1876) (“The second amendment 
declares that [the right to bear arms] shall not be infringed; but this, as has been seen, means 
no more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress. This is one of the amendments that 
has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the national government . . . .”). 
51 See  Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535-38 (1884). 
52  See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908), overruled by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 
U.S. 1 (1964); see also Palko, 302 U.S. at 323-24 (rejecting incorporation of Double Jeopardy 
Clause). 
53  That pronouncement came in Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 259 U.S. 530, 543 (1922), 
which is discussed supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
54  E.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (holding that states cannot 
award damages to public-official defamation plaintiffs unless they prove “actual malice”). 
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burning,55 flag salutes,56 hate speech,57 prayer in public school,58 government 
religious displays,59 faith-based exceptions to generally applicable laws,60 
discretionary licensing rules,61 commercial speech,62 public-employee speech,63 
religious-school funding,64 and on and on. Today, it is hard to imagine a U.S. 
Constitution that provides no protections against state action that constrains 
expressive and religious liberties. But it is hard to imagine only because of the 
quiet revolution that sprang from Gitlow and its near-in-time successor rulings. 
4. “Jot-for-Jot” Incorporation 
The Gitlow line of cases quietly embodied another ruling on incorporation 
that, in time, profoundly reshaped the law of constitutional rights. This is so 
because, in cases such as Schneider and Cantwell, the Court simply assumed its 
way around a doctrinal question that long has vexed constitutional analysts.65 
The question is this: If the Court deems the protections provided by a particular 
Bill of Rights provision to be sufficiently fundamental to merit incorporation, 
 
55  E.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 411-12 (1989) (holding that Texas flag-burning 
statute both triggered and could not survive strict scrutiny). 
56  E.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943) (invalidating state 
statute that compelled public school children to salute American flag). 
57  E.g., R.A.V. v. City of Saint Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992) (rejecting ordinance that 
banned only fighting words “which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouse[] 
anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender” 
(quoting ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990))). 
58  E.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962) (invalidating classroom prayer 
conducted in public school). 
59  E.g., Allegheny County v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 579 (1989) (finding county stand-alone 
crèche display unconstitutional, while upholding display of menorah accompanied by 
nonsectarian holiday symbols), abrogated in part by Town of Greece v. Galloway, 575 U.S. 
565 (2014). 
60  E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (finding that denial of unemployment 
compensation to worker who lost her job due to sincere Sabbatarian belief and practice 
violated free-exercise principles). 
61  E.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 430-31 (1993) 
(overturning city’s refusal to allow distribution of commercial publications through 
freestanding newsracks located on public property). 
62  E.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 
771-73 (1976) (invalidating state prohibition on advertising prescription drug prices). 
63  E.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983) (recognizing opportunity of state and 
local employees to assert free-speech claims but rejecting claim on facts presented). 
64  E.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947) (recognizing limits on state 
authority to fund religious schools but upholding neutral state law with respect to bus 
transportation of all students). 
65 See supra notes 38-40, 44-46, and accompanying text (discussing Court’s approach in 
Schneider and Cantwell). 
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must the Court apply against the states each and every feature of that protection 
to exactly the same extent that that protection operates to limit the actions of the 
federal government? Notably, in Gitlow itself, Justice Holmes wrote a separate 
opinion, dissenting from the majority’s refusal to find a First Amendment 
violation, that expressed his readiness to apply only the “general principle of 
free speech” to the states.66 In other words, it might be that the Fourteenth 
Amendment, in light of its vague phrasing, would leave states with a “somewhat 
larger latitude” to pass speech-limiting laws than Congress possessed as a result 
of the “sweeping language” that the First Amendment itself directs at only 
federal authorities.67 
The Court, however, simply blew through this analytical complexity in its 
post-Gitlow rulings. The coup de grâce came in Cantwell, as the Court declared, 
without any explanation at all, that “the legislatures of the states [are] as 
incompetent as Congress to enact . . . laws” that offend First Amendment 
principles.68 Again, from a present-day perspective, this “jot-for-jot” view of 
how to deal with incorporated Bill of Rights protections may seem 
uncontroversial. But, as Holmes’s dissent in Gitlow itself illustrates, the jot-for-
jot approach to incorporation was hardly a foregone conclusion. In fact, in later 
cases, the Court specifically rejected this view of exact rights-parity in dealing 
with other incorporated Bill of Rights protections. In Betts v. Brady,69 for 
example, the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment did not cover “every 
such case” in which the Sixth Amendment required the federal government to 
supply indigent criminal defendants with counsel.70 Likewise, in Wolf v. 
Colorado,71 the Court saw fit to incorporate only the “core” protections afforded 
by the Fourth Amendment’s Search and Seizure Clause and thus declined to 
make the exclusionary rule applicable to the states.72  
The Court later overruled the specific holdings of Betts and Wolf.73 Even in 
doing so, however, the Justices did not endorse jot-for-jot extension to the states 
of all incorporated Bill of Rights guarantees.74 To be sure, the Court in time did 
 
66  Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (emphasis 
added). 
67  Id. 
68  See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (emphasis added). 
69  316 U.S. 455 (1942), overruled by Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
70  Id. at 471. 
71 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
72  Id. at 27-28. 
73 See  Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963) (overruling Betts); Mapp v. Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643, 653-55 (1961) (overruling Wolf). 
74  Indeed, in the Gideon case, which overturned the rule of Betts, Justice Harlan wrote 
separately to emphasize this very point. With good reason, he viewed the majority opinion as 
not endorsing the proposition that “we automatically carry over an entire body of federal law 
and apply it in full sweep to the States” when incorporating a particular Bill of Rights 
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embrace a full-scale, jot-for-jot approach, with a key pronouncement coming in 
Benton v. Maryland.75 There, as the Court applied the Double Jeopardy Clause 
to the states, it declared in across-the-board fashion that “[o]nce it is decided that 
a particular Bill of Rights guarantee is ‘fundamental to the American scheme of 
justice,’ the same constitutional standards apply against both the States and the 
Federal Government.”76 In making this pronouncement, however, the Court 
relied primarily on the “increasing number” of cases that had cut down the scope 
of unincorporated protections, with the leading decisions in that stage-setting 
line of authority embodying quiet revolutions of their own.77  
 
safeguard. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 352 (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting, in addition, that he did 
not “understand the Court” to hold that “the Fourteenth Amendment ‘incorporates’ the Sixth 
Amendment as such”). 
75  395 U.S. 784 (1969). 
76  Id. at 795 (citation omitted) (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968)). 
77 Of particular importance, a five-Justice majority had endorsed all-out incorporation of 
the Fifth Amendment’s Self Incrimination Clause in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), 
declaring in categorical terms that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment secures against state 
invasion the same privilege that the Fifth Amendment guarantees against federal 
infringement.” Id. at 8 (emphasis added). In support of this jot-for-jot view of Self 
Incrimination Clause protections, however, the Court relied on little more than its earlier, not-
on-point rulings in Gideon and Mapp and the broad assertion that the protection against self-
incrimination was an “essential mainstay” of the American accusatorial process. See id. at 
7-8. Not surprisingly, adherents of the Court’s prior non-jot-for-jot approach took aim at this 
aspect of the Court’s ruling in Malloy. See id. at 16 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (rejecting “simple 
device of incorporating . . . the whole body of law that surrounds a specific prohibition 
directed against the Federal Government [because] compelled uniformity is inconsistent with 
the purpose of our federal system”); id. at 21 (Fortas, J., concurring) (disagreeing with 
majority’s “implication . . . that the tail must go with the hide”). In soon-to-follow cases, 
however, majorities of the Court endorsed jot-for-jot incorporation of other Bill of Rights 
safeguards, relying largely on Malloy in doing so. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155 (incorporating 
fully Sixth Amendment’s right to trial by jury); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965) 
(incorporating fully Sixth Amendment’s right to confront accusers). Because the Court in 
Benton could and did point to these earlier rulings, its wholesale endorsement of jot-for-jot 
incorporation, although revolutionary in its effects, was not entirely quiet, if it was quiet at 
all. Nor was the Court’s approach to the case surprising because courts not infrequently distill 
a broad and unifying legal principle through the application of inductive reasoning to a 
disparate set of prior, specialized rulings. Even so, some of those earlier rulings (in particular, 
Gideon and Mapp) did not even purport to embrace the jot-for-jot approach, while others 
(most prominently, Malloy) endorsed jot-for-jot incorporation only as to a specific clause, 
while relying largely (and dubiously) on Gideon and Mapp in doing so. None of this is meant 
to suggest that no good reasons support across-the-board jot-for-jot incorporation. Justice 
Black, for example, long argued on originalist grounds for this approach, and practical 
concerns about judicial manageability also weigh in favor of the Court’s one-size-fits-all 
approach. See Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 72-73 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting) 
(discussing original intent of Fourteenth Amendment’s framers, particularly Representative 
Bingham), overruled in part by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). The relevant point is 
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In any event, the starting point of all of this was the quintessentially quiet set 
of post-Gitlow rulings that embraced wholesale incorporation of each clause set 
forth in the First Amendment. Put another way, the quiet revolution that had its 
origins in Gitlow did not stop with its dramatic expansion of communicative and 
religious liberty. As significant as those developments were, Gitlow’s impact 
swept further. The Court’s action in that case set the stage for an incorporation-
doctrine revolution that, in time, came to render applicable to the states virtually 
every protection set forth in the Bill of Rights in an all-out, full-scale fashion. 
B. Corporate Personhood Under the Fourteenth Amendment 
The most curious quiet-revolution ruling in the Court’s long history came in 
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co.78 That case, which arose 
out of a challenge to a state tax placed on railroad properties, presented an array 
of issues under both state and federal law, but one issue stood out. The case 
presented the question whether corporations, in addition to individual human 
beings, qualify as “persons” for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process and Equal Protection Clauses.79 The answer to this question was far 
from a no-brainer. The original Constitution routinely uses the term “persons” 
in referring to only natural persons,80 and prior rulings of the Court had 
established that corporations do not qualify as “citizens” for purposes of Article 
IV’s Privileges and Immunities Clause.81 Of no less consequence, the Court in 
the seminal Slaughter-House Cases82 had denied relief to local butchers who 
challenged a meat-handling monopoly based largely on the rationale that the 
Fourteenth Amendment was focused on aiding the “newly-made freeman and 
citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited 
dominion over him.”83 This line of reasoning offered little support (to say the 
 
that the Court’s early decisions that opted for a jot-for-jot approach were quiet insofar as they 
did not set forth these reasons. And this is most prominently the case with regard to the Court’s 
seminal post-Gitlow First Amendment incorporation rulings. 
78  118 U.S. 394 (1886). 
79 See id. at 395. 
80  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (stating that no “person” shall be eligible for House 
membership under certain conditions); id. § 3 (discussing “Persons” to be counted for 
purposes of House-seat apportionment); id. § 5 (stating that no “person” shall be eligible for 
Senate membership under certain conditions). 
81  See, e.g., Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 178 (1869) (emphasizing that “in no 
case which has come under our observation, either in the State or Federal courts, has a 
corporation been considered a citizen within the meaning of that provision”), overruled on 
other grounds United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). 
82  83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
83  Id. at 71. 
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least) for reading the Amendment to afford broad protections to the Southern 
Pacific Railroad Company.84 
Nonetheless, the ruling in Santa Clara County did just that, and it did so in 
the quietest of ways. In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Waite never even 
mentioned, far less addressed, the question: “Is a corporation a person?” Nor did 
he have to because, as things turned out, the Court ruled for the railroad based 
on principles of state, not federal, law.85 How then could it be that Santa Clara 
County came to resolve this foundational matter of constitutional doctrine? In 
the syllabus that accompanied the opinion in the case, the Court’s Reporter 
included the following passage: 
One of the points made and discussed at length in the brief of counsel for 
defendants in error was that “Corporations are persons within the meaning 
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.” 
Before argument, Mr. Chief Justice Waite said: “The court does not wish 
to hear argument on the question whether the provision in the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, applies to 
these corporations. We are all of opinion that it does.”86 
Based on this pronouncement, it became settled law that corporate entities are 
indeed “persons” for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.87 Yet, under long-
accepted principles of Supreme Court practice, syllabi are “not the work of the 
court, but are simply the work of the Reporter, giving his understanding of the 
decision, prepared for the convenience of the profession.”88 In Santa Clara 
County, however, “to the Reporter fell the decision which enshrined the 
declaration in the United States Reports.”89 And few rulings in the Court’s 
 
84  See Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 87 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting) 
(“The history of the Amendment proves that the people were told that its purpose was to 
protect weak and helpless human beings and were not told that it was intended to remove 
corporations in any fashion from the control of state governments. . . . The language of the 
Amendment itself does not support the theory that it was passed for the benefit of 
corporations.”). See generally ADAM WINKLER, WE THE CORPORATIONS: HOW AMERICAN 
BUSINESSES WON THEIR CIVIL RIGHTS 143-53 (2018) (recounting history of Santa Clara 
County). 
85  Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 400-05, 414-16 (1886). 
86  Id. at 396 (syllabus). 
87  See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 780 n.15 (1978) (“It has been settled 
for almost a century that corporations are persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 574-76 (1949) (Jackson, J., 
concurring) (documenting long-standing nature of the rule, dating back to the ruling in Santa 
Clara County). 
88  United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 322 (1906) (syllabus). 
89  C. PETER MAGRATH, MORRISON R. WAITE: THE TRIUMPH OF CHARACTER 224 (1963). 
More specifically, before finalizing the headnote, the Reporter corresponded with Chief 
Justice Waite, who wrote back, “I leave it with you to determine whether anything need be 
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history have had a more profound impact.90 Later landmark cases, ranging across 
such varied subjects as defamation law,91 campaign-finance regulation,92 and the 
rules related to the taking of private property,93 came about only because of the 
declaration of law set forth in the Santa Clara County syllabus. As with other 
issues discussed in this Article, the point is not that the stated proposition was 
erroneous. The point instead is that a seminal constitutional ruling—later 
described by Justice Douglas as one of the “most momentous” in the Court’s 
history—came in a paradigmatically quiet-revolution ruling.94 Indeed, that 
ruling was so quiet that it did not even make its way into an actual opinion of 
the Court. 
C. Reverse Incorporation 
The Fifth Amendment includes a Due Process Clause. The Fourteenth 
Amendment includes both a Due Process Clause and an Equal Protection Clause. 
One plausible, if not indisputable, implication of this textual contrast is hard to 
miss—namely, that the protections created by the due-process guarantees apply 
in the same way to both the federal government and the states, but the differing 
protections created by the Equal Protection Clause necessarily apply only to the 
states and not to the federal government. By way of a quiet revolution, however, 
the Court moved sharply away from this position with its so-called “reverse 
incorporation” jurisprudence.  
This story begins with Hirabayashi v. United States95 and Korematsu v. 
United States,96 in which the Court rejected challenges to World War II-era 
federal programs that culminated in the internment of some one hundred twenty 
 
said about [the issue] in the report inasmuch as we avoided meeting the constitutional question 
in the decision.” JACK BEATTY, AGE OF BETRAYAL: THE TRIUMPH OF MONEY IN AMERICA, 
1865-1900, at 173 (2008). As Jack Beatty has noted, these words suggest that the Court in the 
end purposefully “avoided” deciding the issue for which the case came to stand. Id. at 172. 
90  See, e.g., KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & NOAH FELDMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 486-87 
(19th ed. 2016) (noting key role played by Santa Clara County in Lochner-era rulings). 
91  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964) (vindicating corporation’s claim 
that state defamation law violated its free-expression rights). 
92  Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784-86 (holding statute placing campaign expenditure limits on 
corporations to be unconstitutional). 
93  Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (upholding claim of unlawful 
regulatory taking asserted by corporation). 
94  William O. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 736 (1949); see Wheeling 
Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 576-77 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (emphasizing 
that Court’s ruling in Santa Clara County was “cryptic,” that “[t]here was no history, logic, 
or reason given to support” it, and that “the result was [not] so obvious that exposition was 
unnecessary”). 
95  320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
96  323 U.S. 214 (1944), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
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thousand citizens and lawful residents of Japanese descent.97 The rulings stand 
today as some of the most vilified in the Court’s long history.98 The key point 
here, however, is that even as the Court crushed basic rights with one hand, it 
began to put in place new rights with the other. In particular, notwithstanding 
the absence of an Equal Protection Clause in the Bill of Rights, the Court in 
Korematsu announced that “all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of 
a single racial group are immediately suspect,” so that “courts must subject them 
to the most rigid scrutiny.”99 Put another way, despite the now-condemned, 
liberty-flouting result in the case, the Court declared itself ready to use the Fifth 
Amendment Due Process Clause to subject federal programs marked by racial 
or ethnic discrimination to the same (or, at least, much the same) probing form 
of scrutiny that state programs would receive under the Fourteenth Amendment 
Equal Protection Clause. 
This idea bore fruit in Bolling v. Sharpe,100 which involved an attack on the 
de jure segregation of Washington, D.C.’s public schools. Because the District 
of Columbia is not a state, the Court could not apply the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s equal-protection-based principle of Brown v. Board of Education 
to extinguish the District’s race-based practice. Even so, the Court declared: 
The Fifth Amendment . . . does not contain an equal protection clause . . . . 
But the concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from 
our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclusive. The “equal 
protection of the laws” is a more explicit safeguard of prohibited unfairness 
than “due process of law,” and, therefore, we do not imply that the two are 
always interchangeable phrases. But, as this Court has recognized, 
discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process.101 
 
97  Dean Maseru Hashimoto, The Legacy of Korematsu v. United States: A Dangerous 
Narrative Retold, 4 UCLA ASIAN PAC. AM. L.J. 72, 75 (1996). Korematsu itself involved the 
exclusion of Japanese Americans from certain areas of the West Coast. In Hirabayashi, which 
preceded Korematsu, the Court upheld a curfew imposed only on persons of Japanese 
ancestry. The Court in that case asserted (with citation only to cases involving state 
discrimination) that “[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry are by 
their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of 
equality,” so that “[w]e may assume that these considerations would be controlling” if the 
challenged federal action did not involve “the danger of espionage and sabotage, in a time of 
war.” Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100 (first citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); 
then citing Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 271 U.S. 500 (1926); and then citing Hill v. Texas, 316 
U.S. 400 (1942)). 
98  See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (declaring what was “already 
obvious”—namely, that “Korematsu was gravely wrong the day it was decided [and] has been 
overruled in the court of history”). 
99  Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 216. 
100  347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
101  Id. at 499. 
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Citing Hirabayashi and Korematsu, the Court went on to observe that 
“[c]lassifications based solely upon race must be scrutinized with particular care, 
since they are contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect.”102 
The Court concluded by observing that, “in view of our decision that the 
Constitution prohibits the states from maintaining racially segregated public 
schools, it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a 
lesser duty on the Federal Government.”103 
One can quibble about whether the Court’s ruling in Bolling perfectly fits the 
quiet-revolution label. Unlike in Gitlow, for example, the Court’s discussion (as 
the quoted passages indicate) reached beyond a single sentence. Moreover, the 
Court did not simply cite past authorities; it also reasoned that “our traditions,” 
coupled with the “American ideal of fairness,” dictate that some protections 
embodied in the state-limiting Equal Protection Clause should extend to the 
federal government by way of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause.104 
Even so, the Court’s analysis in Bolling left much unsaid. Most notably, the idea 
of reaching the opposite result in the case may not have been—at least as a 
textual or historical matter—as “unthinkable” as the Court summarily 
suggested.105 Central to James Madison’s constitutional theory, for example, 
was the idea that the dangers posed by oppression at the hands of political 
majorities are far greater at the state level of government than at the federal 
level.106 Building on this thought, the Court might have left it to Congress to 
 
102  Id. The Court also referenced Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) and (albeit with 
only a “cf.” signal) Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948). Buchanan, however, was readily 
distinguishable as embodying a Lochner-era freedom-of-contract pronouncement. Buchanan, 
245 U.S. at 78. And in Hurd—a companion case to Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), in 
which the Court found state-court enforcement of privately created, racially restrictive home-
sale covenants violative of the Equal Protection Clause—the Court did not consider any 
constitutional question at all. See Hurd, 334 U.S. at 34 (invoking “rights intended by Congress 
to be protected by the Civil Rights Act” and, in the alternative, “the public policy of the United 
States”). Finally, the Court in Bolling cited Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896), in 
which the Court had asserted that “the Constitution of the United States, in its present form, 
forbids, so far as civil and political rights are concerned, discrimination by the General 
Government, or by the States, against any citizen because of his race.” Bolling, 347 U.S. at 
499 (quoting Gibson, 162 U.S. at 591). But that case, which involved an unsuccessful claim 
that the state had excluded blacks from a state-court jury in a case involving a black defendant, 
was susceptible to a procedural-due-process-centered reading. See Gibson, 162 U.S. at 591 
(observing that “[i]n the administration of criminal justice no rule can be applied to one class 
which is not applicable to all other classes”). To the extent that the quoted one-sentence 
pronouncement in Gibson might have suggested more, it effectively embodied a quiet 
revolution of its own. 
103  Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500. 
104  See supra notes 101-102 and accompanying text. 
105  See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
106  See generally THE FEDERALIST NOS. 10, 51 (James Madison). 
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address segregation in the D.C. schools in the post-Brown period while 
marshaling its own resources to root out state-sponsored segregation, 
particularly in the American South. The Court, however, did not pause to 
consider these possibilities as it read the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause 
to embody the same protections derived in Brown from the states-constraining 
Equal Protection Clause. 
These observations are (emphatically) not offered to show that the Court 
decided Bolling the wrong way. They do suggest, however, that one can readily 
view the reverse-incorporation concept as the product of a quiet revolution. In 
Hirabayashi and Korematsu, the Court in essence deemed the Fifth 
Amendment’s overlap with Equal Protection Clause guarantees against race 
discrimination to be self-evident, at least when it came to some unspecified set 
of abridgments of “civil rights.”107 In Bolling, the Court offered little more, 
perhaps because no dissenters stepped forward to question the result or the 
analysis in the case. Especially in light of Hirabayashi and Korematsu, one 
might say that Bolling was not entirely “quiet” in its reasoning because it openly 
adverted to a principle of deeming race-and-ethnicity-based discrimination so 
distinctly intolerable that it must run afoul of both due-process and equal-
protection safeguards. But that view of things, even if indisputably correct, 
shines a light on a more deeply quiet revolution—that is, the Court’s later hook-
line-and-sinker transplantation into the Fifth Amendment of all of its Fourteenth 
Amendment Equal Protection jurisprudence, including as to non-race-related 
matters. 
The story of post-Bolling reverse incorporation is both complex and simple. 
It is complex because it involved a series of rulings that dramatically refashioned 
the governing principle of Bolling over an extended period of time. It is simple 
because, in the end, it put in place a straightforward doctrinal proposition—
namely, that “[e]qual protection analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the 
same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment.”108 A key step along the way 
came in Schneider v. Rusk,109 in which the Court invalidated a federal program 
that afforded different treatment to naturalized citizens and birthright citizens. 
In deeming its equality-centered assessment of this federal program legally 
proper, the Court simply cited Bolling,110 without noting the “particular” 
concern expressed in that case about “[c]lassifications based on race” or 
otherwise offering any discussion of the Fifth Amendment’s proper reach.111 A 
 
107  See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
108  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976) (per curiam); accord United States v. Paradise, 
480 U.S. 149, 166 n.16 (1987) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he reach of the equal protection 
guarantee of the Fifth Amendment is coextensive with that of the Fourteenth . . . .”). 
109  377 U.S. 163 (1964). 
110  Id. at 168 (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954)). 
111 See supra note 102 and accompanying text (setting forth these passages in Bolling). 
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decade later, in Jimenez v. Weinberger,112 the Court closely scrutinized a federal 
program that discriminated against certain categories of nonmarital children, 
now relying (and relying only) on a citation to Schneider v. Rusk coupled with a 
citation to Bolling.113 Within a year, in Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld,114 the Court 
stood ready to propound the sweeping and now-governing principle that “equal 
protection claims,” whether brought under the Fourteenth Amendment or the 
Fifth Amendment, are to be treated by courts “precisely the same.”115 
 
112  417 U.S. 628 (1974). 
113  Id. at 637 (first citing Schneider, 377 U.S. at 168; then citing Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499); 
see also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969) (first citing Schneider, 377 U.S. at 
168; then citing Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499) (invalidating discriminatory federal law targeting 
newly arriving state residents), overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
114  420 U.S. 636 (1975). 
115  Indeed, the Court deemed the principle so well-established by earlier cases that it was 
set forth only in a footnote. See id. at 638 n.2 (citing Bolling, Schneider, Jimenez, and two 
earlier sex-discrimination cases, which likewise had triggered references to Bolling); see also 
Kenneth L. Karst, The Fifth Amendment’s Guarantee of Equal Protection, 55 N.C. L. REV. 
541, 554 (1977) (noting that, after Bolling, “[i]n case after case, fifth amendment equal 
protection problems are discussed on the assumption that fourteenth amendment precedents 
are controlling”). For a treatment of the law as it stands today, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 696-97 (5th ed. 2015). Notably, in the 
aftermath of Wiesenfeld, there have been a few—though only a very few—way stations along 
this road. In particular, the Court has assessed state classifications based on alienage more 
critically than federal laws that discriminate on the same ground. See, e.g., Mathews v. Diaz, 
426 U.S. 67, 84-85 (1976) (“The equal protection analysis . . . involves significantly different 
considerations [when] it concerns the relationship between aliens and the States rather than 
between aliens and the Federal Government.”). Even this modest limitation on full-blown 
reverse incorporation is beside the point here, however, because (as the Court itself has made 
clear) discriminatory state laws of this sort implicate not only equality interests but also 
specialized constitutional concerns founded on the express textual grant of federal authority 
over immigration matters. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 377-78 (1971) (noting 
that, apart from concerns based on historical discrimination and lack of political rights held 
by noncitizens, “[t]he National Government has broad constitutional powers” regarding their 
status, so that state discrimination against noncitizens threatens additional “overriding 
national policies in an area constitutionally entrusted to the Federal Government” (quoting 
Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948))); Michael B. Coenen, 
Combining Constitutional Clauses, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1085-86 (2016) (reflecting on 
this aspect of Graham in characterizing case as resting on joint operation of two constitutional 
provisions). In just one other field of law—the field of affirmative action—did the Court for 
a time tinker with the idea that the protections of equality embedded in the Fifth Amendment 
might have a different valence than those afforded by the Fourteenth. See City of Richmond 
v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 486-91, 504-05, 507-09 (1989) (plurality opinion); id. at 
521-25 (Scalia, J., concurring). In Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 
(1995), however, the Court repudiated even this narrow refinement, holding that “all racial 
classifications, imposed by whatever federal, state, or local government actor, must be 
analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.” To be sure, Justice O’Connor offered a 
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To say the least, this principle was revolutionary in its impact. Indeed, it has 
given rise to foundational rulings that reach across the subjects of gay and 
lesbian rights,116 sex-discrimination law,117 and claims regarding so-called 
“fundamental” interests.118 No less surely, this generalized Fifth Amendment 
“equal protection principle”119 came into the law with the deepest level of 
quietness. Indeed, in the pre-Wiesenfeld cases, the Court simply relied on Bolling 
(and on authorities that in substance did nothing more than rely on Bolling) 
without ever acknowledging that constitutional doctrine was shifting in a major 
way. Still more curiously, the Court’s Bolling-based synthesis in Wiesenfeld—
to the effect that courts must apply “precisely the same” limits to state and 
federal rules challenged as unconstitutionally discriminatory120—took hold even 
though Bolling itself had emphasized that Equal Protection Clause guarantees 
and Due Process Clause safeguards are neither “mutually exclusive” nor 
“always interchangeable.”121 Bolling thus painted a picture of a constitutional 
world in which some forms of discrimination by the federal government would 
not “be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due process,” even if state 
discrimination of exactly the same kind did offend the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
“more explicit” protection.122 As a result, the Court’s post-Bolling reverse-
discrimination rulings worked a particularly remarkable quiet revolution. The 
Court relied on Bolling—and, for all practical purposes, only on Bolling—to lay 
 
detailed, non-quiet rationale for this holding in Adarand, but (not surprisingly) in doing so 
she relied heavily on the Court’s already-in-place quiet-revolution reverse-incorporation 
jurisprudence. See id. at 224. What is more, her defense of the Court’s articulated principle of 
“congruence” in the affirmative-action context focused, as had Bolling itself, on the proper 
handling of federally imposed “racial classifications.” See id. 
116  See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 774 (2013). 
117  See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 62 (1981) (involving exclusion of women from 
requirements to register for draft); Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 500-01 (1975) 
(involving sex-based discrimination among military service members); Frontiero v. 
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 680 (1973) (plurality opinion) (involving sex-based discrimination 
as to spousal benefits). 
118  See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 642 (1969) (addressing equal-protection 
principles as applied to federal treatment of fundamental right of interstate movement); see 
also Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 100 (1976) (applying equal-protection 
principles in invalidating federal hiring rule that discriminated against noncitizens). 
119  Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976); accord Mathews v. De Castro, 429 
U.S. 181, 182 n.1 (1976). 
120 Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. at 638. 
121  Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). 
122  Id. For an earlier suggestion along the same lines, see Detroit Bank v. United States, 
317 U.S. 329, 337-38 (1943) (“Unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, the Fifth contains no equal 
protection clause and it provides no guaranty against discriminatory legislation by 
Congress.”). 
  
2019] QUIET-REVOLUTION RULINGS 2083 
 
down a seminal doctrinal proposition directly contradictory to the one that 
Bolling actually had announced. 
D. Post-Brown Equal-Protection Law 
The story of Bolling reveals how a seemingly limited constitutional principle 
(there, one focused on the reverse incorporation of protections against race-
related discrimination) can be transformed into a broader principle (namely, one 
of across-the-board reverse incorporation) by way of follow-on quiet-revolution 
rulings. This phenomenon is not limited to reverse incorporation. Consider, for 
example, what came of the Court’s decision in Brown. In that canonical ruling, 
the Court concluded that the then-widespread practice of racial segregation in 
public education violated the Equal Protection Clause.123 Many years before 
Brown, however, the Court had upheld state programs of racially segregated 
transportation facilities in Plessy v. Ferguson.124 The Court thus had to navigate 
Plessy as it ruled in Brown. It might well have done so by overruling that earlier 
case. But the Court chose to take another route, identifying the “primary 
question” as involving “the constitutionality of segregation in public education” 
and deeming Plessy inapplicable in the school context.125 In the end, the 
education-centered holding of the Court could not have been more explicit. As 
 
123  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). 
124  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550-51 (1896). 
125  Brown, 347 U.S. at 495; id. at 491 (emphasizing that “Plessy . . . involv[ed] not 
education but transportation”); id. at 494-95 (reiterating district court finding focused on 
harmful effects of “[s]egregation of white and colored children in public schools” and adding 
that “[a]ny language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected”). Following up 
on this core point, the Court emphasized that, at the time the Amendment was ratified, the 
development of public education in the South “had not yet taken hold” and that “[e]ven in the 
North, the conditions of public education did not approximate those existing today.” Id. at 
490. Thus, it was “not surprising that there should be so little in the history on the Fourteenth 
Amendment relating to its intended effect on public education.” Id. In light of these 
circumstances, the Court found it necessary to “look instead to the effect of segregation itself 
on public education.” Id. at 492. The Court then emphasized that “[t]oday, education is 
perhaps the most important function of state and local governments”; that everyone 
recognizes the “importance of education to our democratic society”; and that education 
operates as “a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him 
for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.” Id. 
at 493. Education had become so important that “it is doubtful that any child may reasonably 
be expected to succeed in life” without it. Id. Thus, “intangible considerations,” especially for 
“children in grade and high schools,” were of critical significance. Id. at 493-94. In this regard, 
separating schoolchildren “because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority . . . in a way 
unlikely ever to be undone” while simultaneously slowing “the educational and mental 
development of negro children.” Id. at 494. 
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Chief Justice Warren declared, “We conclude that in the field of public 
education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.”126 
On its face, Brown raised the prospect of hard-fought follow-on battles about 
the constitutionality of racial segregation in noneducational settings. That, 
however, is not how things played out. Rather, as Professors Kathleen Sullivan 
and Noah Feldman have observed, “[d]espite the Court’s emphasis on the school 
context in Brown, its results in later cases were reached in brief per curiam 
orders.”127 The Court first outlawed segregated beaches, then golf courses, then 
buses, then parks, all by way of one-sentence pronouncements that did not even 
pause to cite Brown.128 Drawing on these precedents, the Court later 
categorically declared that “it is no longer open to question that a State may not 
constitutionally require segregation of public facilities.”129 The Court thus 
reworked the principle of Brown to reach far beyond the educational setting. 
This reworking of doctrine, unlike Brown itself, overruled Plessy, thus 
generating profoundly salutary social changes. There can be no doubt that 
powerful legal justifications supported this post-Brown expansion of the 
principle of Brown. Whatever the reason, however, the Court chose not to 
articulate those justifications. It opted instead to reframe the principle of Brown 
in a series of quiet-revolution rulings. 
E. Means-Ends Analysis 
At the heart of constitutional law lies means-ends analysis. Equal-protection 
law, for example, is built around the principles of minimum, intermediate, and 
strict scrutiny—each of which directs attention to the sufficiency of an identified 
government purpose and how well the challenged classification fits together 
with the achievement of that purpose. When it comes to strict scrutiny, for 
example, the Court asks whether the challenged classification is “narrowly 
tailored” to advance a “compelling state interest.”130 Of no small importance, 
judicial use of the means-ends methodology reaches far beyond the equal-
protection context. Evaluating the fit between means and ends is standard fare, 
for example, in cases that involve free speech,131 substantive due process,132 the 
dormant Commerce Clause,133 the Free Exercise Clause,134 the Privileges and 
 
126  Id. at 495. 
127  SULLIVAN & FELDMAN, supra note 90, at 666. 
128  See id. (collecting cases). 
129  Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61, 62 (1963) (per curiam). 
130  E.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003). 
131  E.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197-98 (1992). 
132  E.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90 (1987). 
133  E.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 622-23 (1978). 
134  E.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32 
(1993); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). 
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Immunities Clause of Article IV,135 and Second Amendment gun rights.136 In 
sum, the methodology of means-ends analysis extends across almost all areas of 
constitutional-rights law. It is also the product, and has been the source, of many 
quiet-revolution rulings. 
1. The Quiet-Revolution Origins of Means-Ends Analysis 
A central question about means-ends law is seldom asked: Just where did this 
methodology come from? As long ago as the Lochner era, the Court put means-
ends review to work.137 But why? The clauses that trigger means-ends analysis 
do not speak of means or ends. Nor is it obvious that judicial use of this 
methodology always, if ever, makes good sense. In a celebrated article, for 
example, Professor (and later Justice) Hans Linde urged that even minimum 
means-ends review under the Due Process Clause intrudes too much on 
legislative prerogatives.138 Serious methodological problems also loom over the 
subject. Government ends, for example, are often difficult to identify,139 and 
courts can manipulate results by characterizing those ends at different levels of 
generality.140 Key questions raised in applying means-ends analysis border on 
the imponderable. What makes a state interest rise to the level of being 
“compelling,” as opposed to only “important”?141 When does a challenged law 
fail to qualify as “narrowly tailored” to its end, as opposed to being only 
“substantially related”?142 And, once again, what justification supports using 
means-ends analysis in the first place? 
Perhaps the best answer to the last of these questions is: “Common sense!” 
Everyone agrees, for example, that not all laws that restrict speech are 
unconstitutional. Courts thus need to distinguish permissible laws from 
 
135 E.g.,  Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 283 n.14 (1985). 
136  See, e.g., David B. Kopel & Joseph G.S. Greenlee, The Federal Circuits’ Second 
Amendment Doctrines, 61 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 193, 302 (2017) (discussing how heightened 
scrutiny applies to Second Amendment rights); Joan H. Miller, The Slow Evolution of Second 
Amendment Law, SEATTLE U. L. REV. SUPRA, 2014, at 3, https://digitalcommons.law.seattleu. 
edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=sulr_supra [https://perma.cc/Q9XM-MSL8] 
(arguing that courts should apply intermediate scrutiny to gun regulations). 
137  See, e.g., Lindsley v. Nat. Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78-79 (1911). 
138  See Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 241-42 (1976); 
see also Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2326-30 (2016) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (vigorously challenging Court’s “tiers-of-scrutiny approach to constitutional 
adjudication” as wrongly “reducing constitutional law to policy-driven value judgments”). 
139  Linde, supra note 138, at 220-21 (discussing difficulties inherent in deciphering 
legislative intent). 
140  See, e.g., Michael Coenen, Characterizing Constitutional Inputs, 67 DUKE L.J. 743, 
771-74 (2018) (discussing complexities of characterizing government interests). 
141  Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (identifying need to establish “important” 
interest to satisfy intermediate scrutiny). 
142  Id. (setting forth “substantially related” component of “intermediate scrutiny” test). 
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impermissible ones, and means-ends analysis can provide a helpful sorting 
device. Intuition suggests, for example, that a law that threatens core 
constitutional values should give way if there exists a workable “less restrictive 
alternative” for achieving the government’s underlying purpose.143 Stupid laws 
are not necessarily unconstitutional. But stupid laws that clash with rights of free 
expression, religious liberty, or bodily autonomy probably should be the first to 
go. Means-ends analysis seems defensible to the extent that it pushes results in 
this sensible direction.  
Other styles of review, however, might work even better to advance these 
aims. Common in European courts, for example, is so-called “proportionality” 
analysis, which—while resembling means-ends scrutiny in some respects—
might provide a better mode of review to the extent that it brings additional 
relevant considerations into play.144 In some constitutional settings, the Justices 
themselves have abandoned the rhetoric of mean-ends scrutiny, opting instead 
for a more open-ended inquiry into whether the challenged action is 
“reasonable.”145 Justice Thurgood Marshall argued for the use of a “sliding 
scale” approach to equal-protection cases, under which a variety of factors—the 
nature of the discrimination, the importance of the personal interest at stake, the 
state’s justifications for the law, the availability of alternative means for 
pursuing those justifications, and perhaps other considerations, too—properly 
weigh in the decisional balance.146 Some already-accepted doctrines seem to 
reflect much the same orientation. The multifactor weighing of individual and 
state interests used by the Court to assess procedural-due-process cases offers 
an illustration.147  
 
143  See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981) (putting 
forward “least restrictive means” test). 
144  See, e.g., Joshua E. Weishart, Equal Liberty in Proportion, 59 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
215, 280-92 (2017) (arguing for “direct-proportionality” review); see also Reeve T. Bull, 
Market Corrective Rulemaking: Drawing on EU Insights to Rationalize U.S. Regulation, 67 
ADMIN. L. REV. 629, 666 (2015) (describing proportionality analysis). See generally VICKI C. 
JACKSON, CONSTITUTIONAL ENGAGEMENT IN A TRANSNATIONAL ERA 60-64 (2010) (discussing 
proportionality, balancing, and means-end analysis). 
145  See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 190 (2008) (plurality 
opinion). 
146  See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-99 (1973) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (explaining that “this Court’s decisions in the field of equal 
protection defy such easy categorization” as is suggested by traditional tiers-of-scrutiny 
approach); Rebecca Brown, Deep and Wide: Justice Marshall’s Contributions to 
Constitutional Law, 52 HOW. L.J. 637, 643 (2009) (noting that “Justice Marshall viewed the 
‘strict scrutiny’ standard as one point along a ‘spectrum of standards’ to be used by the 
Court”). 
147  See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (setting forth three-factor test for 
procedural-due-process cases under which courts consider “[f]irst, the private interest that 
will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such 
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The salient point is that the Court’s wide-ranging endorsement of means-ends 
analysis came into the law through a quiet revolution. Like a fog bank that moves 
“on little cat feet,”148 means-ends review crept into constitutional doctrine in all-
but-unnoticed (and unquestioned) silence. Unlike most fog banks, however, this 
fog bank never lifted. It continues to overhang the law, together with a welter of 
important decision-guiding sub-rules, many of which originated in quiet-
revolution rulings of their own.  
2. The Working Rules of Means-Ends Analysis 
One sub-rule involves the “strict scrutiny” standard. This rhetoric first 
surfaced in a single sentence in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson149 as the 
Court invalidated a compulsory sterilization law on equal-protection grounds.150 
Of particular significance, the Court seemed to view strict scrutiny as proper in 
the case because it involved so “basic” a civil right that “the very existence and 
survival” of the human race depended on it.151 Before long, however, the Court 
had found its way to applying this formulation across a sweeping spectrum of 
constitutional cases.152 In similar fashion, the Court in Personnel Administrator 
of Massachusetts v. Feeney153 presented the idea—albeit in dicta and without 
any specific citation to authority—that the government must advance an 
“exceedingly persuasive justification” to justify discrimination on the basis of 
sex.154 Thereafter, in United States v. Virginia155—which involved a challenge 
to the single-sex military-college program provided by the Virginia Military 
Institute—this phrase took on a starring role in Justice Ginsburg’s majority 
opinion. Indeed, it played so prominent a part that Justice Scalia in dissent 
 
interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute 
procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved 
and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail”). 
148  CARL SANDBURG, Fog, in CHICAGO POEMS 71, 71 (1916). 
149 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
150 See id. at 541 (alluding to need for “strict scrutiny of the classification” in assessing 
whether state’s requirement of mandatory sterilization for some serious offenses but not 
others comported with requirements of equal protection). 
151 See id. 
152  See, e.g., United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726 (1990) (plurality opinion) 
(applying strict scrutiny to regulation of speech in public forums); Police Dep’t v. Mosley, 
408 U.S. 92, 98-99 (1972) (applying strict scrutiny to content-based speech regulation); see 
also Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982) (applying strict scrutiny under 
Establishment Clause to law that reflects “denominational preference”). 
153  442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
154 See id. at 273; accord, e.g., Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 
(1982); Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981). 
155  518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
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assailed the Court for effectively jettisoning the traditional intermediate level of 
review in favor of de facto strict scrutiny.156 
In another set of quiet-revolution rulings, the Court drew upon the concept of 
strict scrutiny to develop the now-familiar ends-related “compelling state 
interest” standard.157 This story began with Justice Frankfurter’s concurring 
opinion in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,158 in which he observed that state 
authorities lacked “reasons that [were] exigent and obviously compelling” 
enough to justify a distinctly problematic interference with academic 
freedom.159 Even though Justice Frankfurter—a committed proponent of 
contextual balancing in the free-speech context—did not purport to set forth a 
broadly applicable test, the second Justice Harlan cited the passage in NAACP 
v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson160 to support the assertion that the “subordinating 
interest of the State must be compelling.”161 Again, however, that case presented 
a narrow and distinctly appealing free-speech claim based on Alabama’s effort 
to gain access to NAACP membership lists. With Bates v. City of Little Rock,162 
the Court inched toward a more aggressive stance, as Justice Stewart wrote for 
the Court that “[w]here there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, 
the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating interest which is 
compelling.”163 At the same time, Justice Stewart offered no guidance on when 
an “encroachment” would qualify as “significant,” and (even more important) 
he signaled that the form of “compelling-ness” the Court had in mind was so lax 
that it might require nothing more than “a reasonable relationship to the 
achievement of the governmental purpose.”164  
Not until three years later did a high-octane “compelling state interest” test 
take firm hold in free-expression law. The seminal moment came with the 
 
156  See id. at 571-72 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that majority used “phrase 
‘exceedingly persuasive justification’ . . . in a way that contradicts [the] precedents”). 
157  For a far more detailed account, see Stephen A. Siegel, The Origin of the Compelling 
State Interest Test and Strict Scrutiny, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 355, 356 (2006). 
158  354 U.S. 234 (1957). 
159  Id. at 262 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
160  357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
161  Id. at 463 (quoting Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 365 (1957)). 
162  361 U.S. 516 (1960). 
163  Id. at 524. 
164  Id. at 525; see Siegel, supra note 157, at 372 (claiming that, “[b]y using the 
‘compelling’ and ‘reasonable’ standards interchangeably, Stewart’s opinion intimated an 
equivalence between them” and that “just two weeks after Bates, most of the low-protectionist 
Justices showed that they understood Bates to stand for the ‘reasonable’ standard when they 
cited and quoted only Stewart’s second paragraph as providing ‘the requirements of our 
cases’”); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 
1274, 1284-85 (2007) (recounting that Court did not apply strict scrutiny in any serious way 
until the 1960s). 
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Court’s six-to-three decision in NAACP v. Button.165 There, with no small 
measure of hyperbole, Justice Brennan proclaimed that “[t]he decisions of this 
Court have consistently held that only a compelling state interest in the 
regulation of a subject within the State’s constitutional power to regulate can 
justify limiting First Amendment freedoms.”166 Building on this platform, the 
Court in later years fashioned a wide range of exacting speech-rights 
doctrines.167 
As this account shows, the “compelling state interest” standard came to 
operate in free-expression law in a manner akin to the “clear and present danger” 
test. Invoked initially in limited and ambiguous ways, that standard became—
first haltingly, then robustly—a linchpin component of a broadly protective set 
of First Amendment rights. No less important, the quiet revolution that spawned 
the “compelling state interest” formulation did not stop with free-speech law. In 
later cases, that standard found its way, first, into free-exercise law168 and, later, 
into equal-protection doctrine.169 These developments involved quiet 
revolutions of their own because the Court, in its key rulings, never paused to 
explain why this cross-clause transfer of the compelling-interest requirement 
made good sense. Nor was the soundness of the transplantation self-evident. In 
the view of Professor Siegel, for example, the “compelling state interest” litmus 
worked its way into Free Speech Clause jurisprudence to deal with distinctly 
free-expression-related concerns within the Court.170 In any event, the larger 
 
165  371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963). 
166  Id. Even more important, in striking contrast to Bates, no wishy-washy rhetoric about 
“reasonable” efforts to advance “the governmental purpose” found its way into Justice 
Brennan’s unmistakably speech-sensitive opinion for the Court. See, e.g., id. (emphasizing 
that “[b]road, prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect” and that 
“[p]recision of regulation must be the touchstone”); id. at 444 (noting absence of “substantial 
regulatory interest” supporting state’s intervention). 
167  See, e.g., Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigative Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963) 
(“[I]t is an essential prerequisite to the validity of an investigation which intrudes into the area 
of constitutionally protected rights of speech, press, association and petition that the State 
convincingly show a substantial relation between the information sought and a subject of 
overriding and compelling state interest.”). 
168  See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). 
169  See Siegel, supra note 157, at 381 (detailing how “after strict scrutiny’s appearance in 
the First Amendment in 1963, its various branches migrated piecemeal into the Equal 
Protection Clause” and that “compelling state interest test, which was the last branch of strict 
scrutiny to make the move, was not employed in equal protection analysis until 1969”). 
170  In particular, Justices Black and Douglas styled themselves First Amendment 
absolutists, while Justices Frankfurter and Harlan generally opted for a state-sensitive 
“reasonableness” evaluation of laws challenged under the Free Speech Clause. See id. at 
365-75. Against this backdrop, according to Professor Siegel, the “compelling state interest” 
test found its way into the books as Justice Brennan sought to chart a middle course between 
these views in the specialized free-expression context. See id. at 360. 
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point is apparent: In a series of quiet-revolution decisions dealing with the 
“compelling state interest” test, a significant reworking of free-expression, free-
exercise, and equal-protection doctrine swept across constitutional law. 
F. Substantive Free-Speech Doctrine 
1. First Amendment Limits on Nonlegislative Actors 
 The First Amendment begins with the words “Congress shall make no 
law.”171 Even so, the Court has never seen fit to confine the Amendment’s reach 
to legislative conduct. Rather, it has proceeded on the understanding that the 
actions of executive and judicial officials, no less than those of legislative 
officials, are subject to First Amendment constraints. As with other quiet 
revolutions, the Court’s embrace of this view came without fanfare—indeed, 
without any explanation at all. A key ruling was Bridges v. California,172 which 
grew out of the issuance of contempt citations against newspaper commentators 
who had published provocative articles concerning pending criminal 
proceedings.173 In assessing the defendants’ constitutional arguments, the Court 
began its analysis by noting that the case concerned “no direction by the 
legislature of California.”174 Instead, the contempt orders found their source in 
the “common law” power of judicial tribunals, which arose entirely “by reason 
of their creation as courts,” to ensure “the fair and orderly administration of 
justice.”175 Even so, the Court barreled forward, invalidating the contempt 
citations without even considering the possibility that the First Amendment’s 
protections (here, as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth 
Amendment) might be inapplicable due to the absence of legislative action.176 
Notably, Justice Frankfurter, joined by three colleagues, penned a twenty-seven-
page dissent. His analysis, however, focused exclusively on the long-accepted 
authority of courts to impose sanctions on out-of-court statements that might 
influence pending proceedings. Just like the majority, he voiced not one whit of 
concern about extending First Amendment limits to nonlegislative action. 
Instead, he too asserted, again without further explanation, that free-expression 
 
171  U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). 
172  314 U.S. 252 (1941). 
173  See id. at 268 (noting that “this is the first time [following Gitlow] that we have been 
called upon to determine the constitutionality of a state’s exercise of the contempt power in 
this kind of situation”). 
174  Id. at 260. 
175  Id. at 259. 
176  See id. at 268 (rejecting out of hand idea that “criteria applicable under the Constitution 
to other types of utterances are not applicable, in contempt proceedings, to out-of-court 
publications pertaining to a pending case”). 
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protections apply just as much to “a decision of a court” as to “a rule of 
law . . . declared in a statute.”177  
In later cases, the Court made it clear that the First Amendment extends to 
non-legislator executive officers just as surely as it extends to judges.178 In Elrod 
v. Burns179 and follow-on cases, for example, the Court overturned actions taken 
by executive-branch decision-makers to terminate or otherwise disadvantage 
employees based on party membership.180 In light of these authorities, Justice 
Brennan could declare with confidence in 1974 that “[t]he First Amendment 
binds the Government as a whole, regardless of which branch is at work in a 
particular instance.”181 Even more important, not a single Justice took issue with 
the Court’s recent pronouncement in Matal v. Tam182 that “[t]he First 
Amendment prohibits Congress and other government entities and actors from 
‘abridging the freedom of speech.’”183  
In recent years, a few academic commentators have questioned this 
proposition, advancing the idea that courts should pay closer heed to the First 
Amendment’s first word.184 There are considerations reaching beyond the text 
 
177  Id. at 296 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335-36 
(1946) (noting that “[w]hile there was a division of the Court in the Bridges case as to whether 
some of the public expressions by editorial comment transgressed the boundaries of a free 
press and as to the phrasing of the test, there was unanimous recognition that California’s 
power to punish for contempt was limited by this Court’s interpretation of the extent of 
protection afforded by the First Amendment” (citing Bridges, 314 U.S. at 297 (Frankfurter, 
J., dissenting))). For a more recent pronouncement of the relevant principle, see Citizens 
United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 326 (2010) (noting that “[c]ourts, too, are bound by the First 
Amendment”). 
178  Daniel J. Hemel, Executive Action and the First Amendment’s First Word, 40 PEPP. L. 
REV. 601, 623 (2013) (“Although the executive branch is not the First Amendment’s 
grammatical subject, the executive branch is still subject to constitutional constraints . . . .”). 
179  427 U.S. 347 (1976). 
180 See id. at 373. In another set of cases, the Court has invoked the First Amendment to 
invalidate actions taken by executive agencies or other nonlegislative boards, such as state 
bar associations. See generally Konigsberg v. State Bar, 353 U.S. 252 (1957); Schware v. Bd. 
of Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 232 (1957). 
181  Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 
454 U.S. 464, 511 (1982) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
182  137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017). 
183  Id. at 1757 (emphasis added). 
184  See, e.g., GARY LAWSON & GUY SEIDMAN, THE CONSTITUTION OF EMPIRE: TERRITORIAL 
EXPANSION AND AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY 43 (Yale Univ. Press 2004) (“The simple fact is 
that the First Amendment by its terms does not apply to executive or judicial actions . . . .”); 
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Objects of the Constitution, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1028 
(2011) (“[The First Amendment] is written in the active voice, with a single, identifiable 
subject. . . . The First Amendment announces the answer to the who question with its first 
word: ‘Congress.’”); Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. 
L. REV. 1209, 1252-53 (2010) (“[T]he First Amendment is written in the active voice, with a 
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that offer some support for this point of view. For example, James Madison, who 
served as the primary architect of the First Amendment, emphasized in The 
Federalist that “the primary risk of abused power came from legislative 
officials,” as opposed to members of the executive and judicial departments.185 
As a result, the wording of the First Amendment might combine with founding-
era theory to support limitation of the Amendment’s operation to legislative 
action. Despite these points, one senses that arguments along these lines offer 
far too little, far too late. This is because a quiet revolution has long since 
occurred, building into our law—with justifications, to be sure, even though they 
remain unstated to this day—a conception of expressive and religious liberties 
much broader than what a more text-conscious parsing, once upon a time, might 
have wrought. 
2. Clear and Present Danger 
Another quiet revolution in free-speech law came with Justice Holmes’s 
famous formulation of the “clear and present danger” test in Schenck v. United 
States.186 Today, this four-word phrase stands as a shield of American liberty. 
At the outset, however, it was something very different. Indeed, a unanimous 
Court drew on the “clear and present danger” concept in Schenck itself to uphold 
the defendant’s conviction,187 even though he had done nothing more than 
distribute an “impassioned” anti-war circular that urged readers to “assert your 
rights.”188 Indeed, Holmes may have formulated the “clear and present danger” 
idea with a plan to do nothing more than differentiate, whether for free-speech 
 
clear and express subject. Its ringing first words are: ‘Congress shall make no law . . . .’” 
(omission in original)); see also Mark P. Denbeaux, The First Word of the First Amendment, 
80 NW. U. L. REV. 1156, 1158 (1986) (“Article I, section 1 of the Constitution states: ‘All 
legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . . .’ If 
this is the ‘Congress’ intended by the framers of the Bill of Rights, then the first amendment 
clearly prohibits the legislative branch . . . from making laws that abridge freedom of speech 
and press and just as clearly places no prohibitions upon either the judicial or executive 
branches.”). 
185  DAN T. COENEN, THE STORY OF THE FEDERALIST, HOW HAMILTON AND MADISON 
RECONCEIVED AMERICA 123 (2007) (detailing Madison’s view on this point); see also, e.g., 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 252-53 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (asserting 
that it is “against the enterprising ambition” of legislatures “that the people ought to indulge 
all their jealousy and exhaust all their precautions”). 
186  249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (recognizing government’s authority to act if “in such 
circumstances” words used are “of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that 
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent”). 
187  Id. at 52-53. 
188  Id. at 51. 
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purposes or otherwise, between conduct properly prosecuted under the criminal 
law as an attempt and nonchargeable pre-attempt preparation for action.189  
Any doubt about the then-toothlessness of the “clear and present danger” 
rhetoric fell away with the Court’s ensuing rulings in Debs v. United States and 
Frohwerk v. United States. In each of those cases, Holmes wrote for all nine 
Justices in upholding the jury’s “reasonable” finding that draft avoidance and 
military insubordination were the “natural and intended effect” of anti-war 
communications.190 Building on this momentum, a majority in Gitlow indicated 
that the “clear and present danger” formulation required nothing more than “a 
natural tendency and probable effect.”191 It also held that an even less speech-
protective standard applied in a large category of cases—namely, all cases that 
did not involve “general provisions” that simultaneously covered both speech 
and nonspeech behavior, as opposed to cases in which “the legislative body itself 
has previously determined the danger of substantive evil arising from utterances 
of a specified character.”192 In short, in the years following the Court’s ruling in 
Schenck, the Court took a narrow view of protecting even core political speech. 
During this same period, however, a quiet revolution began to occur under the 
banner of the “clear and present danger” rubric. In a trilogy of now-famous 
dissenting and concurring opinions, Justices Holmes and Brandeis made the case 
for expanding the constitutional protections afforded to political agitators.193 
Holmes continued to insist that Schenck was rightly decided,194 and even his 
most prominent dissent of the era “is marred by ambiguity.”195 Nonetheless, his 
new approach, and even more so that of Justice Brandeis, called for ratcheting 
 
189 See  LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 841 (2d ed. 1988) (noting 
that Court’s reasoning and result it reached could be seen as reconcilable with then-prevailing, 
statist notion that “speech was punishable as an attempt if the natural and reasonable tendency 
of what was said would be to bring about a forbidden result”). 
190  Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 215 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 
204, 206 (1919); see TRIBE, supra note 189, at 842 (noting Court’s deferral to jury’s 
purportedly reasonable determination that natural and intended effect of expressions at issue 
was to obstruct recruiting or to cause insubordination). 
191  Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 671 (1925). 
192  Id. 
193  See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372-80 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring), 
overruled by Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam); Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 
672-73 (Holmes, J., dissenting); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 624-31 (1919) 
(Holmes, J., dissenting). 
194  Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“I never have seen any reason to 
doubt that the questions of law that alone were before this Court in the cases of Schenck, 
Frohwerk, and Debs were rightly decided.” (citations omitted)). 
195  See TRIBE, supra note 189, at 895. 
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up the requirements of both likelihood and imminence suggested by the “clear 
and present danger” formulation.196 
Most important of all, despite its initial hesitation, the Court as a whole began 
to apply the “clear and present danger” standard both with strengthened rigor 
and in a broadened set of cases. By 1945, Justice Black could describe the lay 
of the land in the following terms: 
[T]he “clear and present danger” language of the Schenck case has afforded 
practical guidance in a great variety of cases in which the scope of 
constitutional protections of freedom of expression was in issue. It has been 
utilized by either a majority or minority of this Court in passing upon the 
constitutionality of convictions under espionage acts, under a criminal 
syndicalism act, under an “anti-insurrection” act, and for breach of the 
peace at common law. And very recently we have also suggested that “clear 
and present danger” is an appropriate guide in determining the 
constitutionality of restrictions upon expression where the substantive evil 
sought to be prevented by the restriction is “destruction of life or property, 
or invasion of the right of privacy.”197 
The Court in the same case applied the “clear and present danger” touchstone 
in assessing whether courts could sanction negative out-of-court commentary 
directed at the handling of pending judicial proceedings.198 It also explained that, 
under the now-operative version of the test, “the substantive evil must be 
extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances 
can be punished.”199 
In short, over two decades, a quiet revolution in free-speech law had come to 
pass. A four-word phrase, initially used in upholding a conviction without an 
apparent design to expand expressive freedom in a dramatic way, had morphed 
into a muscular libertarian principle applicable in a sweeping range of free-
speech contexts.200 It bears emphasis that the Court’s build-out of the “clear and 
 
196  Most notably, in his concurring opinion in Whitney, Justice Brandeis emphasized the 
need for a showing of imminence, especially in light of the opportunity for counterspeech to 
work with the passage of time. 274 U.S. at 376 (Brandeis, J., concurring). In addition, he 
refined the requirement of a “clear” danger to focus not only on a high probability of harm 
but also on the severity of the harm that was threatened. See id. at 378. 
197  Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 262 (1941) (footnote omitted) (citations omitted) 
(quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940)). 
198  See id. at 261-63, 273. 
199  Id. at 263. 
200  Nor did the impact of the Schenck rhetoric end with the Court’s ruling in Bridges. In 
later cases, the Court continued to put the “clear and present danger” formulation to work in 
vindicating First Amendment liberties in additional contexts. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 
395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) (per curiam) (drawing on formula in refining constitutional 
protections of alleged incitement); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574-75 (1968) 
(applying “clear and present danger” standard in public-employee-speech context). 
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present danger” test sometimes involved the Court in very non-quiet, indeed 
heated, internal conflicts.201 In addition, the Justices in post-Schenck cases 
openly offered reasons why an exacting “clear and present danger” test has 
strong roots in First Amendment policy.202 But it was Holmes’s then-unheralded 
four-word phrase—terse and unexplained but laden with interpretive potential—
that served as the verbal vehicle with which the Court in time drove forward 
dramatic reforms in free-speech law.203  
G. Congressional Powers 
Few events have figured more prominently in our nation’s history than the 
Great Depression, the ensuing election of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, and 
the enactment of his New Deal programs of Keynesian reform. These 
developments ushered in major changes in constitutional law, and many of those 
changes came by way of high-profile, carefully reasoned rulings.204 Others, 
however, involved quiet revolutions. 
The reworking of constitutional doctrine during the New Deal era focused 
largely on endorsing an expanded vision of Congress’s power to regulate 
interstate commerce. As late as 1936, in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,205 the Court 
held that a categorical principle foreclosed Congress from invoking the 
commerce power to regulate any and all forms of “production.”206 It followed, 
for example, that Congress could not meddle with the wages and hours of 
workers in even the nation’s largest mines, factories, and agricultural 
facilities.207 A transformative change in commerce-power law came, however, 
with the Court’s ruling in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.208 There the 
 
201  See, e.g., supra notes 172-177 and accompanying text (discussing disagreement that 
marked ruling in Bridges). 
202  Of particular importance in this regard was Justice Brandeis’s defense in Whitney of a 
meaningful “clear and present danger” requirement. See supra note 196 and accompanying 
text. 
203  Another illustration of a quiet-revolution ruling in free-speech law is provided by 
United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), in which the Court set forth a new, four-part 
test for assessing speech-sanctioning operations of generally applicable laws, while offering 
no meaningful explanation for the appropriateness of that approach beyond “we think it 
clear.” Id. at 377. For one suggestion that things were not so clear, see Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 
Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 572 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring) (asserting that “general law regulating 
conduct and not specifically directed at expression . . . is not subject to First Amendment 
scrutiny at all”). 
204  See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 119 (1942) (explaining in detail why Congress 
had authority to regulate amount of farmer’s wheat production even for his own family’s use). 
205  298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
206  See id. at 301. 
207  See id. at 308 (emphasizing that “magnitude” of effects on interstate commerce was 
inconsequential if “character” of regulated industry involved local production). 
208  301 U.S. 1 (1936). 
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Court upheld the National Labor Relations Act, which safeguarded unionizing 
efforts by production workers, insofar as the Act applied to one of the nation’s 
largest steel producers.209  
The majority’s ruling in Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. is not easily described 
as quiet, especially because of the case’s high visibility and the issuance of a 
passionate dissent joined by four disquieted Justices.210 To be sure, the majority 
opinion included quiet elements, especially in its one-sentence brush-off of the 
once-determinative ruling in Carter.211 On the whole, however, the analysis of 
the Court was elaborate and nuanced, built around a painstaking account of the 
many interstate activities engaged in by the Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation. 
As the Court took care to explain, that firm was the nation’s fourth largest steel 
producer, with vertically integrated operations involving coal mining, ore 
mining, river transport, railroading, warehousing, metal making, and steel 
fabrication in locations that ranged from New Orleans to Long Island to 
Memphis and beyond. The Court, quoting the Labor Board, declared that the 
steel mills themselves “might be likened to the heart of a self-contained, highly 
integrated body.”212 More to the point: “They draw in the raw materials from 
Michigan, Minnesota, West Virginia, Pennsylvania in part through arteries and 
by means controlled by the [corporation]; they transform the materials and then 
pump them out to all parts of the nation through the vast mechanism which [the 
corporation] has elaborated.”213 
It was this set of facts that, from all appearances, led the Court to find no 
constitutional overreach in applying the National Labor Relations Act to this 
massive firm. As Chief Justice Hughes explained:  
When industries organize themselves on a national scale, making their 
relation to interstate commerce the dominant factor in their activities, how 
can it be maintained that their industrial labor relations constitute a 
forbidden field into which Congress may not enter when it is necessary to 
protect interstate commerce from the paralyzing consequences of industrial 
war?214 
This disquisition left behind questions about just how far Congress could go 
in regulating labor relations. Yet the striking emphasis in Jones & Laughlin Steel 
 
209 See id. at 49. 
210  See id. at 76 (McReynolds, J., dissenting, joined by Van Devanter, Sutherland & Butler, 
JJ.). 
211 See id. at 41 (majority opinion) (dismissing Carter on ground that Court “was of the 
opinion that the provisions of the statute relating to production were invalid upon several 
grounds”). 
212  Id. at 27. 
213  Id. 
214  Id. at 41. 
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Corp. on the “integrated,”215 “far-flung,”216 and “national”217 character of the 
employer’s operations gave reason to believe that the Court might well deal with 
small, local employers in a very different manner. 
In a major-league quiet-revolution ruling, the Court broke the other way. 
NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing, Co.218 involved an alleged unfair 
labor practice committed by a “small clothing manufacturer with a minuscule 
share of the interstate market.”219 This change in the facts, however, produced 
no change in the result. On the same day it handed down its ruling in Jones & 
Laughlin Steel Corp., the Court also decided Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing, 
Co. The Court’s entire analysis in the latter case was set forth in a single 
sentence: “For the reasons stated in our opinion in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin 
Steel Corp., we hold that the objections raised by respondent to the construction 
and validity of the National Labor Relations Act are without merit.”220 The Court 
in Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing, Co. thus worked a quiet revolution that 
radically expanded the scope of the federal commerce power. In practical effect, 
the Court’s one-sentence ruling transformed Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. from 
a fact-bound treatment of a distinctly national mega-firm into a ruling that 
authorized congressional regulation of countless employers, both large and 
small, throughout the United States. 
II. ORGANIZING THE COURT’S QUIET-REVOLUTION RULINGS 
The examples offered in Part I show the widespread impact of quiet 
revolutions in constitutional law. So, too, do the additional examples offered in 
the pages that follow—examples that range across such widely varying subjects 
as the reach of Second Amendment protections, the one-time “commercial 
speech” doctrine, habeas corpus jurisdiction, and the scope of state sovereign 
immunity from suit. These cases also show that quiet revolutions come in many 
forms. Or do they? The answer to this question, as it turns out, is both “yes” and 
“no.” Yes, because every quiet revolution has distinctive characteristics with 
regard to such matters as the precise nature of the Court’s pronouncement, the 
degree to which the ruling reworks preexisting law, and the level of judicial 
focus on the potential consequences of its action. No, because close inspection 
suggests that all quiet-revolution rulings fall into two major categories: ipse dixit 
declarations and invitational pronouncements. This Part explores the differences 
that mark these contrasting types of Supreme Court action. 
 
215  Id. at 26. 
216  Id. at 41. 
217  Id. 
218  301 U.S. 58 (1937). 
219  DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE SECOND CENTURY, 
1888-1986, at 237 (1990). 
220  Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing, Co., 301 U.S. at 75 (citation omitted). 
  
2098 BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:2061 
 
A. Ipse Dixit Declarations 
Many cases discussed in Part I illustrate the operation of ipse dixit 
declarations. In Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing, Co., for example, the Court 
simply declared in one sentence that the principle of Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp. would apply across the board to localized production facilities.221 In 
Gitlow (as interpreted by later cases), the Court without discussion established a 
hornbook-law rule of foundational significance—namely, that the Fourteenth 
Amendment makes applicable to the states all the protections established by the 
Free Speech and Free Press Clauses.222 In Cantwell, again without openly 
reflecting on the issue, the Court simply announced the full-bore incorporation 
of both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses.223  
Some ipse dixit declarations depart sharply from preexisting law, or at least 
from the direction in which the law then seems to be headed. Consider Patterson 
v. Colorado ex rel. Attorney General.224 That ruling stemmed from a finding of 
criminal contempt based on the publication of a political cartoon that criticized 
a state court’s handling of several then-pending cases.225 In rejecting the 
petitioner’s free-expression-based defense, Justice Holmes began by citing 
authority for the proposition that “the main purpose of [the Speech and Press 
Clauses] is ‘to prevent all such previous restraints upon publications as have 
been practiced by other governments,’ and they do not prevent the subsequent 
punishment of such as may be deemed contrary to the public welfare.”226 The 
Court’s ruling in Patterson thus invited the conclusion that the free-expression 
clauses concern nothing more than licensing denials and other prior restraints. 
By the time of Schenck, however, Justice Holmes was so ready to cut loose this 
constraining proposition that he needed only thirty-nine words to make the point. 
As he wrote for a unanimous Court: “It well may be that prohibition of laws 
abridging freedom of speech is not confined to previous restraints,”227 so that 
“in ordinary times the defendants in saying all that was said in the circular would 
have been within their constitutional rights.”228 Soon thereafter, in Stromberg v. 
 
221  See supra notes 218-220 and accompanying text. 
222  See supra notes 32-64 and accompanying text. 
223  See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text. 
224  205 U.S. 454, 463 (1907). 
225  Id. at 458-59. 
226  Id. at 462 (quoting Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304, 313-14 
(1825)); see also LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND 
PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY 1-18 (1960) (setting forth classic historical treatment of 
this point). Among other things, Professor Levy highlights how the prior-restraints-targeting 
view of the First Amendment had its roots in the writings of Blackstone. See LEVY, supra, at 
173-74. 
227  Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 51 (1919). 
228  Id. at 52. 
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California,229 the Court extinguished any doubt on this score by declaring that 
some applications of ordinary criminal statutes, even though they involved no 
prior restraints, were invalid because they targeted “conduct which the State 
could not constitutionally prohibit.”230 In Stromberg, the Court did not pause to 
discredit the historical argument for a prior-restraint-focused First Amendment 
protection. It simply dispatched in a single sentence the position that the Court 
had seemed to endorse in Patterson. 
Sometimes ipse dixit rulings open legal doors. The Court’s one-liner in 
Stromberg, for example, led to the Court’s development of almost all now-
recognized constitutional free-expression protections because the vast majority 
of communicative-liberty disputes involve not prior restraints but subsequent 
punishments. Other ipse dixit declarations slam doors shut. In Valentine v. 
Chrestensen,231 for example, the Court rebuffed without analysis the idea that 
First Amendment protections accorded to political handbill distributors should 
extend to commercial handbill distributors as well.232 In some cases, as with the 
Court’s treatment of Patterson in Schenck and Stromberg, the Court reworks an 
area of law by simply ignoring, without comment, what it said before.233 These 
“dog that did not bark” rulings have a kinship to decisions in which the Court 
engages in “stealth overruling” by distinguishing an earlier case in a way that 
strips its holding of practical significance.234 Stealth overrulings, however, 
involve an open effort by the Court to deal with the contested precedent, albeit 
by offering distinctions that critics deem flimsy and contrived. In contrast, the 
sort of ipse dixit declarations exemplified by the Court’s later treatment of 
Patterson are quiet in a distinct way because the ruling that sets forth the 
operative declaration offers no analysis of the relevant precedent at all.235  
Ipse dixit declarations sometimes come into the law as obiter dicta, and in 
these cases the Court might well give with one hand as it takes with the other. 
In Gitlow, for example, the Court rejected the defendant’s First Amendment 
 
229  283 U.S. 359 (1931). 
230  Id. at 369. 
231  316 U.S. 52 (1942), overruled by Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975). 
232 See id. at 54; Arnold H. Loewy, The Use, Nonuse, and Misuse of Low Value Speech, 
58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 195, 196 (2001) (noting that, via Chrestensen, “by a simple ipse 
dixit, commercial speech became nonspeech or, at least, no value speech”). In due course, 
Chrestensen was overruled. See Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 820 (1975). For more than 
two decades, however, the ipse dixit declaration made in the earlier case cut off at the pass a 
wide-ranging set of potential First Amendment challenges to commercial-speech regulation. 
233  Another set of cases that illustrates this phenomenon involves the Court’s treatment 
over time of earlier rulings concerning the availability of federal habeas corpus relief. See 
infra notes 276-297 and accompanying text (discussing these cases). 
234  See generally Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular 
Attention to Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1 (2010). 
235  For more on this point, see supra notes 224-226 and accompanying text (discussing 
Patterson). 
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defense, even while setting the stage for a dramatic expansion of expressive 
liberty with its ipse dixit comment on the incorporation of Free Speech and Free 
Press Clause protections.236 In similar fashion, the Court in Hirabayashi and 
Korematsu upheld a sweeping program of oppression directed at a single ethnic 
minority; at the same time, however, it launched the now-far-reaching, rights-
protective phenomenon of reverse incorporation.237 This give-and-take manner 
of judicial maneuvering is not uncommon. Indeed, the poster-child case for such 
behavior is no less of a landmark than Marbury v. Madison. There the Court 
declared that, on the facts presented, it had no jurisdiction to vindicate the 
plaintiff’s rightful claim against the Secretary of State, but it also made use of 
the occasion to set forth in broad terms its power to nullify even duly enacted 
federal statutes and to enjoin the actions even of cabinet officers.238 In some 
quiet-revolution rulings, the same dynamics may be at work. In Gitlow, for 
example, the Court’s “loud” ruling about its lack of authority to protect the 
prosecuted political dissident was accompanied by a quiet move that created the 
opportunity to apply all constitutional free-expression limitations to the states in 
future cases.239 To the extent that ipse dixit declarations work this way, they 
serve to expand the Court’s power in the long run, even as the Justices act with 
seeming self-abnegation in the present moment.240 
The Gitlow line of authorities illustrates another feature of ipse dixit 
declarations: Some quiet revolutions find support in the distortion of precedent, 
particularly as the Court ascribes to an earlier ruling a far-reaching principle that 
the ruling does not embody on any fair view. In Gitlow itself, the Court only 
assumed that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the free-expression rights 
established by the First Amendment.241 In later cases, however, the Court cited 
Gitlow, without batting an eye, as having resolved the very question it 
reserved.242 Likewise, in Bolling v. Sharpe, the Court signaled that the Fifth 
Amendment did not render applicable to the federal government many of the 
anti-discrimination rules directed at states by the Equal Protection Clause.243 In 
 
236  Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925); see supra notes 32-64 and 
accompanying text (discussing Gitlow’s impact). 
237 See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text. 
238 See ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 25 (6th ed. 2016) (“The 
decision is a masterwork of indirection, a brilliant example of Marshall’s capacity to sidestep 
danger while seeming to court it, to advance in one direction while his opponents are looking 
in another.”). 
239 Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 672. 
240  See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1877) (upholding state regulation of grain 
elevator prices because such prices are infused with “public interest” while asserting broad 
judicial authority to police state regulation of “mere private contracts”). 
241  Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 672 (rejecting First Amendment challenge). 
242  See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text (describing later Court’s handling of 
Gitlow). 
243  See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954). 
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later cases, however, the Court relied on Bolling on its way to endorsing exactly 
the opposite proposition.244 Long ago, the legal historian Sir Henry Maine 
emphasized the centrality of the use of legal fictions by courts to facilitate the 
making of needed changes in the law.245 Rulings of the Court that purported to 
draw upon Gitlow and Bolling resonate with Maine’s insight. They demonstrate 
how ipse dixit declarations can reshape the law to adapt to new conditions by 
essentially fictionalizing what has come before.246 
Precisely because ipse dixit rulings require no analytical heavy lifting, they 
can enter the law in unusual ways. Take Robertson v. Baldwin,247 which raised 
the question whether a sailor’s compelled service on a merchant ship based on 
an earlier act of desertion offended the ban on “involuntary servitude” set forth 
in the Thirteenth Amendment. On its way to ruling against the seaman, the Court 
reflected on how constitutional prohibitions often do not call for a strictly literal 
application, observing that “[t]he law is perfectly well settled that the first ten 
amendments to the Constitution . . . were not intended to lay down any novel 
principles of government,” so that unstated exceptions to those protections 
“continued to be recognized as if they had been formally expressed.”248 In 
support of this proposition, the Court proceeded to offer a series of examples, 
including by noting that “the right of the people to keep and bear arms (art. 2) is 
not infringed by laws prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons.”249 
Robertson thus worked a Second Amendment quiet revolution in a case that did 
not involve the Second Amendment at all. In a mere sentence fragment, the 
Justices categorically resolved an issue that, perhaps more than any other, 
occupies the minds of present-day gun-rights advocates.250 
The Second Amendment ruling of Robertson came in twenty-one words. The 
Court’s first explicit endorsement of full-scale reverse incorporation came in a 
footnote. The ipse dixit expansions of Brown v. Board of Education and Jones 
& Laughlin Steel Corp. came in one-line per curiam rulings. And the corporate-
personhood ruling of the Santa Clara County case, as we have seen, came into 
 
244  See supra notes 108-122 and accompanying text (describing how Court relied on 
Bolling to support full application of Equal Protection Clause safeguards to federal 
government). 
245  See HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF 
SOCIETY AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 13-25 (Univ. of Ariz. Press 1986) (1861). For 
another classic treatment of the subject, see generally LON FULLER, LEGAL FICTIONS (1967). 
246  See infra notes 276-297 and accompanying text (offering similar account of Court’s 
development of federal habeas corpus law). 
247  165 U.S. 275 (1897). 
248  Id. at 281. 
249  Id. at 281-82. 
250  See, e.g., Joseph G.S. Greenlee, Concealed Carry and the Right to Bear Arms, 20 
FEDERALIST SOC’Y REV. 32, 32 (2019) (asserting that recognition of concealed-carry right 
finds support in the rulings of “Supreme Court, American history and tradition, and the most 
influential lower court decisions”). 
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the law solely by way of a Court Reporter’s syllabus. Ipse dixit declarations can, 
in short, be found in unusual places. But, however humble their lodgings may 
be, their revolutionary significance remains. 
B. Invitational Pronouncements 
As with ipse dixit declarations, quiet revolutions by way of invitational 
pronouncements enter the law in different ways. Even so, the basic pattern is a 
recurring one, and the Court’s “clear and present danger” cases illustrate that 
pattern well. In Schenck, the Court did not, as it did in cases such as Friedman-
Harry Marx Clothing or Santa Clara County, decide a discrete, legal question 
by way of a brief, categorical proclamation. Instead, the Court—without offering 
any citation to authority or other supportive justification—put forward a phrase 
laden with the potential for later creative use as it worked its way to resolving 
the issue at hand. As things turned out, Charles Schenck did not receive the 
benefit of the quiet revolution launched in his case; instead, with the blessing of 
the Supreme Court, he went to federal prison for six months.251 In later decades, 
however, the “clear and present danger” formulation found its way into dozens 
of opinions, undergirding a sweeping, speech-protective movement in American 
law.252  
Here is the critical point: The key moments in the quiet revolution borne of 
Schenck came not so much in Schenck itself as in later cases in which the Court 
leveraged the open-textured—and thus invitational—nature of the “clear and 
present danger” passage. More specifically, the Court drew on the libertarian 
ring of the phrase over time to help justify libertarian results founded on a 
libertarian theory.253 A transformative line of constitutional authority thus found 
its footing in the sparse but suggestive phrase that Holmes laid down, almost in 
passing, in Schenck. 
Another example of this sort of judicial seed-planting is provided by Chief 
Justice Marshall’s treatment of the commerce power in Gibbons v. Ogden.254 
That case involved congressional regulation of activity that itself was readily 
characterized as “commerce . . . among the several States”—namely, the 
movement of ferries between New Jersey and New York directly across state 
lines.255 On his way to finding a proper exercise of congressional authority, 
however, the Chief Justice dropped a comment that described the federal power 
as reaching “internal concerns which affect the states generally; but not those 
which are completely within a particular state [and] which do not affect other 
 
251  See Alexander Tsesis, Prohibiting Incitement on the Internet, 7 VA. J.L. & TECH. 5, 
¶ 15 (2002). 
252  See supra notes 197-200 and accompanying text (surveying Court’s use of “clear and 
present danger” formulation). 
253  See supra notes 201-203 (discussing build-out of “clear and present danger” concept). 
254  22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
255 See id. at 186. 
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states.”256 This language hinted at the idea that Congress might be able to 
regulate not only the sort of plainly cross-border activities at issue in Gibbons 
itself, but also wholly intrastate activities, so long as they “affect” interstate 
commerce. The Court in time came to uphold a broad range of federal laws on 
this very theory. Of particular importance for present purposes, the Justices drew 
directly on Gibbons’s invitational pronouncement as it did so, reasoning that 
“[a]t the beginning, Chief Justice Marshall described the federal commerce 
power with a breadth never yet exceeded.”257  
Several points about invitational pronouncements merit attention. First, in 
contrast to ipse dixit declarations, invitational pronouncements never close the 
door on future constitutional growth. As we have seen, for example, the Court’s 
ipse dixit declaration in Chrestensen drew a line in the sand, stanching efforts to 
secure protections of commercial speech for nearly a quarter century.258 With 
invitational pronouncements, such a result never occurs. Instead, precisely 
because the Court’s turn of a phrase invites later creative uses, opportunities for 
deploying the Court’s pronouncements are opened up going forward. Their 
significance lies in the potential they quietly create for a follow-up reframing of 
the law. 
Second, while ipse dixit declarations always are consequential because they 
establish new, discrete, and transformative propositions of law, some 
invitational pronouncements end up having no consequences at all. Again, the 
nature of invitational pronouncements indicates why. In cases that post-dated 
Schenck, for example, the Court chose to make far-reaching use of that 
decision’s “clear and present danger” rhetoric.259 In similar fashion, the Court 
invoked opinions that had made only passing and opaque use of the word 
“compelling” as it issued later seminal rulings that both energized and 
dramatically expanded the operation of strict scrutiny in means-ends law.260 
When it comes to invitational pronouncements, however, things do not always 
work out this way. Take Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,261 in which the 
Court invalidated state-imposed poll taxes.262 This core holding did not involve 
anything remotely like an ipse dixit declaration because the Court justified it by 
trumpeting the significance of the franchise at length.263 Justice Douglas, 
however, wove into his analysis the terse observation that “[l]ines drawn on the 
 
256  Id. at 195. 
257  Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942). 
258  See supra notes 231-232 and accompanying text (describing Chrestensen’s impact). 
259  See supra notes 197-203 and accompanying text (discussing development of “clear and 
present danger” formulation). 
260  See supra notes 157-170 and accompanying text (outlining this history). 
261  383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
262  See id. at 670. 
263  See id. at 667, 669. 
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basis of wealth or property, like those of race, are traditionally disfavored.”264 
Here were words pregnant with the potential to give rise to new constitutional 
protections of the poor. Moreover, thoughtful commentators were, at the same 
time, putting forward arguments designed to push the law in precisely this 
direction.265 In later rulings, however, the Court chose not to take up this 
agenda.266 Harper, in short, set forth an invitational pronouncement. The post-
Harper Court, however, chose not to accept the invitation that had been offered. 
A third point regarding invitational pronouncements concerns the complexity 
of the ways in which their use can unfold. Oftentimes, quiet revolutions do not 
involve only invitational pronouncements; rather, they involve a blend of 
invitational pronouncements and ipse dixit rulings. The Gitlow cases, for 
example, involved sharp-edged ipse dixit declarations about whether or not the 
protections of the First Amendment were applicable to the states. Quietly 
embedded in those rulings, however, was also a subtle form of invitational 
pronouncement. In effect, if not in terms, Gitlow invited the Court to consider 
expanding, well beyond the First Amendment, the range of Bill of Rights 
protections that limit state, not just federal, action.267 And over time, that is just 
what the Court did. 
The Court’s means-ends jurisprudence embodies an especially rich mix of 
invitational pronouncements and ipse dixit declarations. As we have seen, the 
entire rhetoric of means-ends analysis crept into the law in a quiet way, and 
important developments in the field involved the Court’s “cashing in” on 
invitational pronouncements to put in place, among other things, a highly 
exacting version of the “compelling state interest” test in many areas of law.268 
At the same time, some means-ends rulings have involved ipse dixit 
declarations—including the unreasoned decisions that deemed the “compelling 
state interest” test applicable in the free-exercise and equal-protection 
contexts.269 To be sure, some build-outs of means-ends law have come in non-
quiet actions, as illustrated by the Court’s openly justified endorsement of 
 
264  Id. at 668. 
265  See, e.g., Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term—Foreword: On 
Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 24 (1969) 
(discussing how Harper raises possibility of constitutional protections based on income). For 
additional ruminations along these lines, see generally Milner S. Ball, Judicial Protection of 
Powerless Minorities, 59 IOWA L. REV. 1059 (1974). 
266  See, e.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 143 (1971) (rejecting challenge to special 
requirement of referendum approval prior to government pursuit of low-rent housing 
projects). 
267  See supra notes 32-64 (highlighting post-Gitlow opinions in which Court expanded 
scope of Bill of Rights protections directed at not only federal but also state actions). 
268  See supra notes 157-170 and accompanying text (discussing this history). 
269  See, e.g., supra notes 168-169 and accompanying text (discussing extension of 
“compelling state interest” test to free-exercise and equal-protection contexts). 
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intermediate scrutiny for sex-discrimination cases in Craig v. Boren.270 But a 
variety of sub-rules in the equal-protection field have entered the law in a quiet 
way. We have seen, for example, how the Court reworked the intermediate 
scrutiny standard to incorporate and energize the “exceedingly persuasive 
justification” test.271 Indeed, even in applying low-level rational-basis scrutiny, 
the Court has invalidated what seem at first blush to be entirely permissible 
forms of government action.272 It has done so in those cases by leveraging the 
open-textured nature of the word “rational” to apply “rationality review ‘with 
bite.’”273  
The Court’s means-ends jurisprudence illustrates a critical point: Sometimes 
a quiet revolution takes the form of a quiet evolution—that is, a process in which 
ipse dixit declarations, invitational pronouncements, and more ordinary forms of 
judicial action interact over time to rearrange a field of doctrine in a far-reaching 
way. In the case of means-ends review, this process primarily has involved 
filling in open spaces in the law. During the early- to mid-twentieth century, as 
the Court moved for the first time to assess large numbers of claims based on 
constitutional protections of liberty and equality, it needed new tools to help it 
carry out its work. As a result, it forged a wide array of means-ends rules, 
building out those rules—sometimes dramatically, but oftentimes subtly—with 
the overarching goal of developing workable mechanisms for dealing with a set 
of legal problems that, for the most part, the Court had not faced before.274 The 
end result was the rich mix of means-ends doctrines that now guide almost all 
of the Court’s rights-related work.275 
Sometimes, quiet revolutions that involve invitational pronouncements work 
in a different way. In these instances, invitational pronouncements and ipse dixit 
rulings (and other rulings, too) interact over time not so much to fill doctrinal 
interstices as to displace preexisting legal structures. Illustrative is the evolution 
of habeas corpus doctrine in the period that preceded the Burger Court, 
 
270  See supra note 13 and accompanying text (describing Craig). 
271  See supra notes 154-156 and accompanying text (outlining changes in sex-
discrimination law, culminating in United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996)). 
272  See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985) (striking down 
application of permitting ordinance that disadvantaged mentally disabled residents); Reed v. 
Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 74 (1971) (striking down sex-based preference in probate law). 
273 See  Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term—Foreword: In Search of 
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. 
L. REV. 1, 34 (1972) (contending, for example, that Reed Court applied new equal-protection 
criteria while continuing to use rational-basis standard); see also Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. 
Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 259 n.2 (2009) (noting Professor Gunther’s description of Reed in 
these terms). 
274  See supra notes 202-203 and accompanying text (discussing similar phenomenon with 
regard to development of “clear and present danger” concept). 
275  See Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2327 (2016) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (reflecting on how “tiers of scrutiny proliferated into ever more gradations”). 
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culminating in the seminal ruling in Brown v. Allen.276 This story is complex, 
but a shorthand summary goes like this: In its early jurisprudence, the Court 
declared that federal courts could grant habeas corpus relief from state court 
action only in the narrow band of cases in which the indirectly attacked judgment 
came from a tribunal that lacked “jurisdiction” in the case.277 Precisely because 
this rule was single-mindedly jurisdiction-centered, it had the effect of confining 
federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to an extremely small set of cases. Over time, 
the Court’s rhetoric shifted without explanation to a focus (at least in some 
cases) on whether the challenged judgment was rightly characterized as 
“void.”278 Soon, the Court was authorizing habeas relief in cases that did not 
involve a lack of “jurisdiction” in any ordinary sense of the word. First, it upheld 
remedial intervention for prisoners who persuaded the habeas tribunal that a 
challenged sentence was unlawfully excessive.279 Next, the Justices endorsed 
the grant of the remedy whenever a federal habeas court determined that the 
petitioner had been convicted under an unconstitutional state statute.280 While 
these new rules greatly expanded access to postconviction relief, their readily 
applied boundaries rendered them not “completely unintelligible.”281 
In later cases, however, the Court’s increasingly rights-protective rhetoric 
produced more inroads. Of particular importance, the Court declared, in a 
pronouncement that now stirs little controversy, that a federal tribunal could 
consider any constitutional challenge to state decision-making processes so long 
as the state system had not addressed that challenge by way of a fair “corrective 
process.”282 Of even greater importance, some cases hinted at an approach that 
was even less—indeed, far less—accommodating of the finality of state court 
judgments. In Ex Parte Royall,283 for example, the Court (in keeping with pre-
existing authority) considered the habeas petitioner’s challenge to the 
constitutionality of the substantive state statute under which he had been 
 
276  344 U.S. 443 (1953). The term “pre-Burger Court” is used here because the law 
described in the ensuing discussion was modified in significant respects by the Burger and 
Rehnquist Courts, as well as by Congress’s enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996. All of this occurred, however, against the backdrop of Brown v. 
Allen. 
277  Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 202 (1830). 
278  Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 176 (1874). 
279 See  Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State 
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 467-68, 471 (1963) (detailing this development). 
280  See id. at 468, 471. 
281 See id. at 471. 
282  Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 335 (1915); see Bator, supra note 279, at 487 
(attributing to this principle “beneficent expansions of the writ we have witnessed over the 
past fifty years”). 
283  117 U.S. 241 (1886). 
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convicted.284 In the process of deciding the case, however, the Court wrote 
loosely about the prospect of recognizing a general federal authority to 
determine in habeas actions “whether the petitioner is restrained of his liberty in 
violation of the Constitution of the United States.”285 Likewise, in Moore v. 
Dempsey,286 the Court authorized habeas relief in a case that fit within the 
tapestry of preexisting law because the state tribunals had not subjected the 
petitioner’s procedural due process claim to “any process of inquiry . . . at 
all.”287 Even so, language cropped up in Justice Holmes’s opinion that pointed 
to the potential availability of habeas relief whenever “the State Courts failed to 
correct the wrong,” regardless of the quality of state-court review processes.288  
The possibility that Moore might produce such a “radical change”289 was 
clouded by later cases in which the Court sometimes reverted to its no-
jurisdiction rhetoric or suggested the centrality of whether a “full and fair 
adjudication” of the contested issue in the state system had occurred.290 With its 
1953 ruling in Brown v. Allen, however, the Court finally flipped the switch. In 
that case, the Court signaled, albeit in an odd configuration of separate opinions 
and statements submitted by eight of the nine Justices, that federal habeas courts 
could reconsider de novo any constitutional claim asserted by any petitioner 
even if that claim had received a fully adequate processing in the state courts.291 
What is important for present purposes is that this ruling had its origins in the 
elaborate body of earlier habeas rulings that, though often quietly, had pushed 
the law in the direction of broadening access to habeas relief. As Professor Bator 
wrote: “What is the basis of Brown v. Allen? The opinions do not cast much light 
 
284  Bator, supra note 279, at 479 (“The question in Royall was the constitutionality of the 
statute creating the offense.”). 
285  Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. at 253. 
286 261 U.S. 86, 91 (1923). 
287  Bator, supra note 279, at 489. 
288  Moore, 261 U.S. at 91. 
289  Curtis R. Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74 
HARV. L. REV. 1315, 1329 (1961). 
290  Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 118 (1944). 
291  See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 458-59 (1953) (indicating appropriateness of 
hearing constitutional claim “even after trial and review by the state”); id. at 500 (Frankfurter, 
J., concurring) (declaring that “prior State determination of a claim under the United States 
Constitution cannot foreclose consideration of such a claim, else the State court would have 
the final say which the Congress . . . provided it should not have”). See generally RICHARD H. 
FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 
1280 (7th ed. 2015) (identifying decision’s “basic principle” as establishing that “federal 
habeas courts should relitigate questions of federal constitutional law that were fully and fairly 
litigated in state court”). 
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on that question.”292 Instead, they set forth “mere statements of conclusion.”293 
In the end, the most illuminating opinion in the case relied on little more than 
the Court’s earlier rulings in Royall and Moore, and even those authorities 
received only a passing mention.294 
There are different ways to think about the quiet revolution that gave rise to, 
and became embodied in, Brown v. Allen. One might say that the Court’s “mere 
statements of conclusion” style of reasoning marked the case itself as setting 
forth a quiet-revolution ipse dixit declaration.295 On another view, the key role 
of Brown v. Allen was to reaffirm the Court’s earlier ipse dixit declaration in 
Moore.296 But Brown v. Allen is probably best seen another way. According to 
this account, the ruling embodied the culmination of a long-in-the-making, case-
by-case reshaping of federal habeas corpus law that involved both quiet-
revolution and non-quiet-revolution components. Some rulings along the way 
embodied ipse dixit declarations—for example, that a want of jurisdiction in the 
ordinary sense was not an essential prerequisite to granting habeas relief. Some 
rulings involved invitational pronouncements—for example, that a judgment’s 
“voidness” provided the proper touchstone for subjecting it to collateral attack. 
Some rulings were not unanimous; Moore, for example, generated a two-Justice 
dissent. But others, such as Royall, triggered no objection at all, so that the 
Court’s suggestive pronouncements came into the law without any 
contemporaneous analytical cross-examination. The bottom line is that a rising 
tide of many decisions prominently including both ipse dixit declarations and 
invitational pronouncements pushed the Court toward abandoning—first a little 
and then a lot—a once-settled, jurisdiction-centered habeas corpus doctrine. 
Brown v. Allen, in short, was largely the product of a number of quiet-revolution 
rulings perhaps best seen as involving a quiet evolution that played out over a 
period of more than one hundred years.297 
 
292  Bator, supra note 279, at 500. 
293  Id. at 501; see id. at 505 (noting that justification for reordering functions of state and 
federal courts in habeas cases “was simply not provided in the opinions in Brown v. Allen”). 
294  See Allen, 344 U.S. at 500 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (providing only “cf.” citation to 
Royall after stating key rule of law); id. at 503 (citing Moore and Royall for proposition that 
past statements about habeas corpus not serving as de facto form of appeal were inapplicable 
in “those extraordinary cases in which a substantial claim goes to the very foundation of a 
proceeding”). 
295 As to the revolutionary character of the ruling, see Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Supreme 
Court, 1958 Term—Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73 HARV. L. REV. 84, 106 
(1959) (“The decision manifestly broke new ground.”). As to its quietness, although Justice 
Jackson challenged the Court’s key holding in a separate opinion, see id. at 532-45, no other 
Justice paused to address his expressions of concern. 
296  See supra notes 294-295 and accompanying text. 
297  A similar process of case-law development culminated in the Court’s landmark holding 
in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits to 
enjoin the operation of state programs so long as the named defendant is a state officer, rather 
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A fourth and final point regarding invitational pronouncements concerns 
constitutional theory. Earlier discussion emphasizes doctrine. But is it possible 
that invitational pronouncements also might spur the development of underlying 
legal theory? An answer of “yes” finds support in the Court’s post-New Deal 
ruling in Carolene Products Co. v. United States.298 There, the Court helped seal 
the demise of the economic-due-process activism of the Lochner era. It did so 
by upholding a congressional ban on the sale of “filled milk” based on a 
deferential application of the “rational relation” test.299 Along the way, however, 
something more enduring happened, and that something happened because of a 
quiet revolution rooted in constitutional theory. This revolution grew out of the 
now most famous footnote in American law—Footnote Four of the Carolene 
Products decision.300 In that corner of Justice Stone’s opinion, he shifted 
attention away from economic regulations to other forms of state control by 
laying down the following pronouncement: 
 
than the state itself. In fact, the Court’s earliest rulings in this field authorized only a limited 
set of actions against state officers on the theory that “a trespass is a breach of duty under state 
law,” thus rendering the named defendant a wrongdoer in his individual character. Henry M. 
Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 524 (1954). 
Even so, according to Professor Hart, the Court over time “came to neglect” this underlying 
theory by moving in “almost imperceptible steps” toward treating “the remedy of injunction 
as conferred directly by federal law for any abuse of state authority which in the view of 
federal law ought to be remediable.” Id.; see Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 152 (emphasizing 
that early cases never specifically “stated that the suit or the injunction was necessarily 
confined” to trespass cases and that intervening cases, even when explicable on trespass 
theory, had more generally spoken of “rights and privileges . . . guaranteed by the 
Constitution”). In essence, the Court’s ruling in Ex parte Young—just like its ruling in Brown 
v. Allen—rested on a mix of past remedy-expanding decisions, handed down over many 
decades, that included both invitational-pronouncement and ipse-dixit-declaration rulings. 
298  304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
299  See id. at 152-53. See generally Geoffrey P. Miller, The True Story of Carolene 
Products, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 397, 397-98 (detailing background and exploring impact of 
Carolene Products). 
300  As Justice Thomas has emphasized, the portion of the Court’s opinion that included 
Footnote Four gained only four votes, albeit in a case in which only seven Justices 
participated. See Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2328-29 (2016) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting). Again, however, the salient point here is not whether the theory set 
forth in Footnote Four is right or wrong, far less whether it constitutes governing law as the 
result of a four-three ruling. Rather, the point has to do with the footnote’s quiet nature (which 
arose in large part precisely because it was only a footnote) and its generally recognized 
revolutionary effects. As Justice Thomas noted, Footnote Four, even though it was “pure 
dicta,” has been “seized upon” by the Court “to justify its special treatment of certain personal 
liberties.” Id.; see, e.g., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (citing Footnote 
Four in reasoning that “[a]liens as a class are a prime example of a ‘discrete and insular’ 
minority . . . for whom such heightened judicial scrutiny is appropriate”). 
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It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those 
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal 
of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial 
scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than 
are most other types of legislation. . . . Nor need we enquire whether 
similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at particular 
religious, . . . or national, . . . or racial minorities [or] whether prejudice 
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which 
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes 
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a 
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.301 
Many words have been written about the significance of this text. But the 
most important academic commentary came from Professor John Hart Ely in his 
justly famous book, Democracy and Distrust, A Theory of Judicial Review.302 
There, Professor Ely argued that the great, guiding principle that overarched the 
Warren Court’s work lay in the representation-reinforcing theory suggested by 
Justice Stone’s musings in Footnote Four—even though those musings were 
“unnecessary” to resolving the issue at hand, as indicated by the third word of 
the quoted portion of the footnote set forth above.  
Professor Ely’s thesis finds support in seminal precedents of the Warren 
Court: Reynolds v. Sims303 and other reapportionment cases,304 Brown v. Board 
of Education,305 Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,306 rulings protective of 
religious minorities such as Sherbert v. Verner,307 and the many rights-
expanding free-expression decisions exemplified by cases such as New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan,308 Cohen v. California,309 and Tinker v. Des Moines 
 
301  Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 153 n.4. 
302  See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL 
REVIEW (1980). For that portion of the book that most specifically focuses on the footnote 
itself, see id. at 75-88. 
303  377 U.S. 533, 584 (1964) (rejecting state use of malapportioned legislative bodies as 
incompatible with constitutional protections of equal voting rights). 
304  See, e.g., Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713, 734-35 (1964) (applying 
constitutional reapportionment rules to malapportioned legislatures established through 
popular vote, as well as legislative action). 
305 See supra notes 123-126 (discussing Brown and its invalidation of programs of 
“separate but equal” public education). 
306  See supra notes 261-263 (discussing Harper and its invalidation of state poll taxes). 
307  See supra notes 60, 134, and 168 (discussing Sherbert and its protection of religious 
minorities in application of unemployment benefits programs). 
308  376 U.S. 254, 283-84 (1964) (sharply limiting government’s ability to subject speakers 
critical of public officials to liability for defamation). 
309  403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) (invalidating conviction of critic of military draft for wearing 
jacket that displayed provocative, but nonobscene, language). 
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Independent Community School District.310 To be sure, the Warren Court’s work 
involved much more than quiet-revolution rulings; indeed, its action in each of 
these cases was emphatically “loud,” as shifting majorities offered extensive 
justifications for their rulings, almost always in the face of provocative dissents. 
The key point here is that the core set of ideas that largely animated these 
decisions was not put forward with trumpet blasts and fireworks. Instead, it was 
outlined in a footnote.  
One can quibble about the location of the dividing line between doctrine and 
theory. We have seen, for example, that key rulings of the Court that involved 
means-ends analysis came into the law with little explanation or controversy.311 
These rulings, without question, involved doctrinal matters. But theory was in 
the picture, too, especially because the use of means-ends review sometimes 
produces results deemed inconsistent with the originalist philosophy of 
interpretation.312  
Another theory-laden quiet revolution—this one largely attributable to the 
most prominent originalist of all—may now be in the process of playing itself 
out. The first chapter of this story was written in well-aged rulings that hinted at 
the notion that some rights spring not from a single constitutional clause but 
from the synergistic operation of two or more clauses.313 The important point for 
present purposes is that the story picked up steam with Justice Scalia’s opinion 
for the Court in Employment Division v. Smith.314 In that case, the Court 
jettisoned the previously recognized principle that generally applicable laws are 
subject to Free Exercise Clause challenge by persons who violate those laws 
based on sincere religious beliefs.315 This redirection of preexisting doctrine was 
 
310  393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969) (recognizing right of public-school students to express 
political views by wearing black armbands). 
311  See supra notes 157-170 and accompanying text (tracing quiet development of 
“compelling state interest” test in free-speech context). 
312  See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (discounting state’s 
originalist argument against claimed right to same-sex marriage and inquiring instead whether 
any sufficient justification for excluding a particular class from right to marry exists); United 
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996) (applying means-ends analysis in rejecting 
exclusion of women from Virginia Military Institute, notwithstanding originalist arguments 
in support of state’s practice); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (applying strict 
scrutiny to invalidate antimiscegenation laws despite origninalist argument that such laws 
were generally viewed as consistent with equal-protection principles both when and long after 
Fourteenth Amendment gained ratifcation). 
313  See, e.g., Coenen, supra note 115, at 1079-81 (noting, for example, constitutional 
synergies involved in Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983), and Griffin v. Illinois, 
351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956)). 
314  494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded in part by statute, Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488, as recognized in Holts v. Hobbs, 574 U.S. 352 
(2015). 
315  See id. at 882-85. 
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quintessentially non-quiet. Justice Scalia defended it at length in his majority 
opinion,316 and four dissenters blasted away at his rationale.317 Even as Justice 
Scalia cut back on free-exercise rights, however, he laid down an invitational 
pronouncement that created new opportunities to develop personal rights in far-
reaching ways.  
At the center of the dissenters’ objections in Smith stood arguments based on 
precedent, especially the Court’s prior ruling in Wisconsin v. Yoder.318 There, 
the Court had confronted a challenge made by Amish parents to a law that 
compelled their children’s school attendance through the age of sixteen even if 
they already had passed the eighth grade.319 The parents argued that, 
notwithstanding this statutory mandate, the Amish faith required their fourteen- 
and fifteen-year-olds to work at home.320 The Court in Yoder might have 
responded that the generally applicable character of the law, which the 
legislature obviously had enacted for reasons far removed from disadvantaging 
the Amish, foreclosed any constitutional attack. The Justices, however, upheld 
the parents’ challenge, reasoning that “only those interests of the highest order 
and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free 
exercise of religion.”321 
In response to the dissenters’ reliance on Yoder and similar authorities, Justice 
Scalia in Smith wrote as follows for a majority of the Court: 
The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars 
application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated 
action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free 
Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such 
as freedom of speech and of the press, or the rights of parents to direct the 
education of their children. . . . The present case does not present such a 
hybrid situation, but a free exercise claim unconnected with any 
communicative activity or parental right.322 
The potential of this language to reshape widely held views of constitutional 
liberty is significant. After all, it seems likely that most judges and lawyers see 
the text of the Constitution as setting forth a listing of separate, freestanding 
constitutional protections. In Smith, however, the Court’s most celebrated 
proponent of textualism pushed forward a read-the-clauses-together view of 
interpretation that was sure to unsettle other text-oriented analysts. Thoughtful 
commentators have begun to explore the hybrid-rights concept, with some of 
 
316  See id. at 877-85, 888-90. 
317  See id. at 908, 910-14, 919-21 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
318  406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
319  Id. at 207. 
320  Id. at 201-13. 
321  Id. at 215. 
322  Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted). 
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them offering words of support.323 Of even greater importance, the Court itself 
picked up the baton in its seminal ruling in the same-sex marriage case. As 
Justice Kennedy explained in declaring the right at issue in that setting to be 
“fundamental”: 
[The] right of same-sex couples to marry that is part of the liberty promised 
by the Fourteenth Amendment is derived, too, from that Amendment’s 
guarantee of equal protection of the laws. The Due Process Clause and the 
Equal Protection Clause are connected in a profound way, though they set 
forth independent principles. Rights implicit in liberty and rights secured 
by equal protection may rest on different precepts and are not always co-
extensive, yet in some instances each may be instructive as to the meaning 
and reach of the other.324 
Justice Kennedy did not cite Smith in support of this pronouncement. But he 
well might have. At the least, he could have pointed to Justice Scalia’s hybrid-
rights reasoning had the dissenters in the same-sex-marriage case challenged his 
intimation that the due-process and equal-protection safeguards can and 
sometimes do work in unison to give rise to protected liberties.  
It remains to be seen what the future holds for this combine-the-clauses theory 
of constitutional law. But in Smith, Justice Scalia created an opening. Even as 
he denied the claim put forward by the religious practitioner involved in that 
case, he invited others to assert new claims of “hybrid” rights. Of such 
pronouncements, quiet revolutions are born. 
III. THE PROSPECTS FOR MORE QUIET REVOLUTIONS 
One question raised by the foregoing discussion is whether the Court in the 
future will continue to launch quiet revolutions by way of invitational 
pronouncements, ipse dixit declarations, or both. In other words, in upcoming 
years, are we likely to encounter additional terse, but transformational, rhetoric 
along the lines of the key passages that appeared in Schenck, Gitlow, Cantwell, 
Bridges, Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing, Co., Santa Clara County, 
Chrestensen, Carolene Products Co., Smith, Robertson, the Court’s post-Brown 
 
323  See, e.g., Kerry Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett, Cumulative Constitutional Rights, 97 
B.U. L. REV. 1309, 1330-31 (2017) (discussing idea of “intersectionality” of clauses); Coenen, 
supra note 115, at 1078 (exploring hybrid-rights decisions); Scott W. Howe, Constitutional 
Clause Aggregation and the Marijuana Crimes, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 779, 878 (2018) 
(describing “aggregation” of clauses that “puts the concerns they embody together”); see also 
Stephen Kanter, The Griswold Diagrams: Toward a Unified Theory of Constitutional Rights, 
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 636 (2006) (describing Court’s Griswold decision as reflecting 
view that “Fourth and Fifth Amendments should be read together”); Laurence H. Tribe, Equal 
Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. 16, 26 (2015) (describing Barnette and 
Obergefell as relying “on no single clause . . . but on the broader postulates of our 
constitutional order”). 
324  Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602-03 (2015). 
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equal-protection decrees, its post-Bolling reverse-incorporation rulings, and the 
various quiet-revolution rulings that marked the evolution of means-ends 
analysis and habeas corpus law? As to this question, the difference between ipse 
dixit declarations and invitational pronouncements may turn out to be important.  
To begin with, shifts in legal practice and the broader culture may render the 
future prospects of ipse dixit declarations less than bright. Put simply, past 
conditions created openings for these sorts of quiet-revolution rulings, while 
present and future conditions seem less hospitable. Of particular importance, the 
nature of Supreme Court opinion writing has changed over the years. In general, 
modern opinions are fewer, longer, and more complex than opinions of the 
past.325 Indeed, until 1988, the Court had no choice but to take jurisdiction over 
a significant number of constitutional cases it otherwise might well have elected 
not to hear on the merits.326 In turn, the Court dealt with many of those cases by 
issuing nothing more than a one-line summary affirmance or a binding on-the-
merits announcement that the matter was “dismissed for want of a substantial 
federal question.”327 Handling these cases took away time that the Court might 
have used to spell out in greater detail its reasoning in other cases. More 
importantly, each of these conclusionary dispositions embodied the sort of 
unelaborated-upon assertion of authority that marks ipse dixit declarations. And 
it may be that, in an environment in which such rulings were routinely delivered, 
 
325  See, e.g., Adam Feldman, Empirical SCOTUS: An Opinion Is Worth at Least a 
Thousand Words, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 3, 2018, 12:03 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com 
/2018/04/empirical-scotus-an-opinion-is-worth-at-least-a-thousand-words/ [https://perma.cc 
/RE3R-NHUC] (“The mean majority-opinion length steadily increased from under 4,000 
words to over 6,000 [from 1951 to 2016].”); see also Ryan C. Black & James F. Spriggs II, 
An Empirical Analysis of the Length of U.S. Supreme Court Opinions, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 621, 
634 (2008) (noting increase in opinion length). 
326  See Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking 
Docket, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1219, 1244 (2012) (noting that this reform occurred in 
1988). 
327  For one prominent example, see Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (mem.) 
(rejecting challenge to prohibition on same-sex marriage), overruled by Obergefell v. Hodges, 
135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). Notably, some of these summary rulings may be seen as involving 
quiet revolutions in their own right, particularly to the extent they were relied on in later 
published opinions that endorsed constitutional principles of far-reaching importance. See 
Marburger v. Pub. Funds for Pub. Sch., 417 U.S. 961, 961 (1974) (mem.) (setting forth one-
line affirmance upon which Court would later rely in Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 370 
(1975), to redefine what constituted impermissible state support of religion in school-supplies 
context); Fincher v. Scott, 411 U.S. 961, 961 (1973) (mem.) (setting forth one-line affirmance 
upon which Court would later rely in Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 53 (1974), to hold 
that state laws that disenfranchise convicted felons are constitutional); Am. Smelting & Ref. 
Co. v. County of Contra Costa, 396 U.S. 273, 273 (1970) (mem.) (setting forth one-line 
dismissal for want of substantial federal question upon which Court would later rely in R.J. 
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham County, 479 U.S. 130, 152 (1986), to uphold 
nondiscriminatory state ad valorem property tax). 
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the Justices came to see it as acceptable to craft ipse dixit declaration rulings 
even in cases of major importance disposed of in published opinions. To the 
extent that any such “we do it all the time” influence came to bear on the Justices, 
it is now long gone. Indeed, not a single member of the current Court sat on it 
during the era of mandatory jurisdiction and resulting summary actions.  
Other recent developments add to the momentum that pushes against the 
issuance of ipse dixit declarations. Dissenting opinions, no less than majority 
opinions, have become more nuanced and nitpicky, thus creating conditions in 
which writers of majority opinions may find it necessary to defend their claims 
with more specificity and depth.328 Far more amicus curiae briefs are filed than 
in the past, so that Justices now may more readily make use of already spelled-
out analytical pathways (and critiques of such pathways) to navigate whatever 
issues a case presents.329 Each of the Justices has more law clerks than in earlier 
days, and those clerks are both well positioned and highly incentivized to comb 
over other Justices’ opinion drafts with a critical eye.330 Perhaps most 
importantly, the tendency toward unanimity that produced many of the Court’s 
most prominent quiet-revolution rulings—for example, in Schenck, Gitlow, 
Cantwell, and Chrestensen—seems to have gone by the wayside, at least in cases 
that present major constitutional questions.331  
Coupled with these changes in the Court’s internal operations has been a 
transformation of the broader culture in which the Court operates. The 
proliferation of mass communications—with talking-head constitutional 
commentators now routinely appearing on televised programming—is 
illustrative of the point.332 Even more influential is the emergence of the internet, 
 
328  See Adam Feldman, Empirical SCOTUS: The Dissenting-est Dissenters on the Modern 
Court, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 26, 2018), https://empiricalscotus.com/2018/02/26/the-
dissentingest-dissenters [https://perma.cc/8UBY-8SDJ] (noting that dissents have steadily 
increased in length, with word count growing by five hundred from 1980 to 2018). 
329  See, e.g., Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae 
Briefs on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 776 (2000) (noting that amicus briefs 
can bring “to the attention of the Court relevant matter not already brought to its attention by 
the parties” and thus “be of considerable help to the Court”); id. at 749 (“[O]ur study shows 
conclusively that the incidence of amicus curiae participation in the Supreme Court has 
increased dramatically over the last fifty years.”). 
330  See, e.g., Black & Spriggs, supra note 325, at 642 (noting “clear and constant trend 
towards the delegation of [opinion-drafting] duties by the Justices” to their law clerks). 
331  Aaron J. Ley, Kathleen Searles & Cornell W. Clayton, The Mysterious Persistence of 
Non-Consensual Norms on the U.S. Supreme Court, 49 TULSA L. REV. 99, 100 (2013) 
(observing that “collapse in unanimity has been accompanied by a dramatic surge in separate 
opinions (both dissents and concurrences)”). 
332  High-profile lawyers who have taken on this role include many types of experts, 
ranging from former prosecutors (for example, Nancy Grace) to one-time presidential 
advisors (for example, John Dean) to celebrated authors (for example, Jeffrey Toobin) to 
former law professors (for example, Greta Van Susteren) to current faculty members (for 
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which hosts blogs and websites devoted in whole or in part to monitoring the 
Court’s activities.333 Political polarization, which tends to generate a critical 
assessment of every move every significant government official makes, appears 
to be on the rise, including with respect to the work of the Justices.334 In recent 
decades, many Court-watchers have signed on with organized interest groups—
most notably, the Federalist Society335 and the American Constitution 
Society336—focused, often critically, on the opinions of the Court. The result of 
these developments, especially in their cumulative effect, is a level of 
watchdogging of the current Court’s activities unlike anything seen in the eras 
of Holmes, Stone, or Brennan. Nor would it be surprising if this heightened 
watchdogging has had and continues to have practical effects in terms of the 
issuance of quiet-revolution rulings. Of special importance in this regard, the 
risk of “getting caught”—and being lambasted for acting in a nonlawyerly 
way—might cause Justices, otherwise open to trying to “sneak” doctrine-
shaping ipse dixit declarations into their opinions, now balk at doing so.337 
There is another respect, too, in which the rise of the information age might 
operate to diminish the future issuance of ipse dixit declarations. Why? Because 
some past constitutional rulings may have come into the law unadorned with 
extensive reasoning simply as a result of the practical challenges of putting 
together a detailed rationale.338 In the modern era, however, it seems likely that 
 
example, Alan Dershowitz). For one account, see Ruth Marcus, Jonathan Turley Takes His 
Case to TV, WASH. POST, July 30, 1998, at B1 (outlining Jonathan Turley’s transition from 
traditional legal scholar to media commentator). 
333  See, e.g., SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com [https://perma.cc/8FE3-AMGA] 
(last visited Sept. 21, 2019). 
334  See, e.g., Carl Hulse, Political Polarization Takes Hold of the Supreme Court, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 5, 2018, at A11 (discussing influence of polarization on public opinion towards 
Court). 
335  See generally Lawrence Baum & Neal Devins, Federalist Court: How the Federalist 
Society Became the De Facto Elector of Republican Supreme Court Justices, SLATE (Jan. 31, 
2017, 10:12 AM), https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/01/how-the-federalist-society-
became-the-de-facto-selector-of-republican-supreme-court-justices.html . 
[https://perma.cc/F7JL-9UUF] (describing history of Federalist Society’s influence in federal 
judicial selection processes). 
336  See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Liberal Legal Group Is Following New Administration’s Path 
to Power, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2018, at A30 (describing rise of American Constitution 
Society as liberal counterweight to conservative Federalist Society). 
337  Cf. Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric: Judicial 
Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1380 (1995) (noting with regard to her service as circuit- 
court judge that “[m]y experience in recent years is that my colleagues of all ideological bents 
scan others’ opinions carefully for any hint of gratuitous approval of doctrinal views to which 
they do not subscribe or unnecessary criticism of those they do”). 
338  See infra note 422 and accompanying text (noting problems in opinion writing that stem 
from time pressures). 
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if a Justice (or a law clerk) is in search of a doctrine-supporting rationale, such 
a rationale will be out there somewhere in a blog post, a law journal tract, or the 
ever-expanding body of opinions issued by the lower courts. In addition, because 
the Court is hearing and deciding fewer cases, more time exists to find and build 
on materials of this kind. To be sure, neither the rise in the watchdogging of the 
Court nor the ready availability of “prefabricated” legal analyses forecloses the 
occurrence of future quiet revolutions. In the end, five Justices can do what they 
want to do, including by issuing ipse dixit declarations. Even so, it is telling that 
ipse dixit declarations—at least of the most far-reaching sort—seem increasingly 
hard to find in the Supreme Court’s work.  
What about invitational pronouncements? Curiously, some of the same forces 
that cut against the future issuance of ipse dixit declarations may help to ensure 
the continued presence of invitational pronouncements in opinions of the Court. 
One point is simple: The greater the length of a majority opinion, the greater the 
number of invitational pronouncements it might contain.339 Cutting the other 
way is the much-reduced total number of opinion-generating decisions the Court 
now hands down—some 69 during the 2016-2017 Term,340 in contrast, for 
example, to 161 during the 1977-1978 Term341 and 182 in the 1937-1938 
Term.342 Despite this reduction in the Court’s issuance of full-blown opinions, 
it seems likely that, one way or the other, at least some invitational 
pronouncements will find their way into majority opinions that now reach 
upwards of ten thousand words in length.343 Another point is important, too. 
Whenever a Court majority sets forth an ipse dixit declaration, the target to shoot 
at is well defined. This is so because, by definition, each such declaration sets 
forth a new, specific, and well-defined point of law. As a result, potential critics 
of the thus-declared doctrinal principle—including dissenting opinion writers—
can readily launch an attack on that principle, leaving the majority little choice 
but to counterattack with a more expansive non-ipse dixit rationale. 
To say the least, invitational pronouncements do not work this way. Instead, 
they come into opinions in passing phrases that do not resolve any issue at all. 
In addition, these pronouncements, precisely because of their passing-phrase 
nature, may gain little attention from Justices when incorporated into majority 
 
339  See infra note 343 and accompanying text (noting growing length of Supreme Court 
opinions). 
340  United States Supreme Court, 2017 J. SUP. CT. U.S. I, II. 
341  United States Supreme Court, 1977 J. SUP. CT. U.S. I, II. 
342  United States Supreme Court, 1937 J. SUP. CT. U.S. I, I. 
343  Adam Liptak, The Roberts Court: Justices Are Long on Words but Short on Guidance, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2010, at A1 (“The lengths of decisions, including the majority opinion 
and all separate opinions, also set a record, at [a median of] 8,265 words.”); Feldman, supra 
note 325 (noting that Cooper v. Harris, 137 S. Ct. 1455 (2017), ran 10,773 words). 
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opinion drafts, including from even majority-opinion writers themselves.344 No 
less important, a potential concurring or dissenting Justice is less likely to take 
on an invitational pronouncement than an ipse dixit declaration—including 
when the relevant formulation does gain notice—precisely because invitational 
pronouncements set forth governing law in only the loosest sense. Thus, even 
dissenters who find themselves troubled by invitational pronouncements 
detected in a majority-opinion draft may pass on the chance to register a critique 
simply because they have bigger fish to fry. Not surprisingly, dissenting-opinion 
writers tend to focus on the actual ruling of the Court, not some turn of a phrase 
that may or may not end up having analytical significance in some future case. 
As a result, invitational pronouncements, woven into majority opinions without 
challenge or explication, will probably continue—at least more so than ipse dixit 
declarations—to find their way into the United States Reports.  
IV. THE NORMATIVE CLAIMS OF QUIET-REVOLUTION RULINGS 
Prognostication about how quiet-revolution rulings will fare in the future is 
tied at the hip to a more basic question: Are ipse dixit declarations and 
invitational pronouncements defensible as a normative matter? This question 
invites a preliminary observation. From all appearances, some quiet-revolution 
rulings are the product of the Court’s total lack of awareness that it is speaking 
to a matter that lends itself even to the possibility of debate. In Robertson v. 
Baldwin, for example, the Court asserted that the Second Amendment does not 
protect the right to carry concealed weapons, while not seeming to sense that the 
question could be (especially more than a century later) a matter of even modest 
controversy.345 One message of this Article is that, in some cases, the Court 
might merit criticism precisely because it fails to recognize the existence of a 
colorable counterargument to a position it tersely asserts with unwavering self-
assurance. More generally, the Court should always be mindful that difficulties 
can lie beneath the surface of even the most innocent-seeming doctrinal 
propositions, especially when they concern highly divisive social issues. 
Nonetheless, at least for purposes of addressing the normative question 
presented here, there is a major difference between the self-aware and the non-
self-aware issuance of a quiet-revolution ruling. In particular, only a Court that 
recognizes that it is on the brink of issuing such a ruling can choose not to do so 
for that very reason. The key question thus becomes whether Justices who find 
themselves in this position are justified, at least sometimes, in moving forward 
with the issuance of quiet-revolution rulings. 
 
344  To be sure, dissenters may raise a hue and cry when a Court majority actually “cashes 
in” on the invitational pronouncement by making use of it in justifying a later controversial 
legal pronouncement. By then, however, the invitational pronouncement has already done its 
work. The majority-opinion writer thus can quote the invitational pronouncement as good law 
(indeed, as unchallenged law), perhaps in launching a sharp doctrinal transformation. 
345 See supra notes 247-250 and accompanying text (discussing Robertson). 
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Different analysts will approach this question in different ways. Thinkers no 
less insightful than Hamilton and Madison, for example, emphasized that 
“experience is the parent of wisdom,”346 “the oracle of truth,”347 and “the guide 
that ought always to be followed whenever it can be found.”348 From this 
perspective, the large number of quiet-revolution rulings documented in this 
Article, handed down by many Justices over many years, provides significant 
evidence of the worthiness of the practice. Others, however, will recoil at this 
line of thinking. For them, a pattern of past behavior hardly merits emulation 
simply because it exists.349 Many past practices, after all, have reflected 
unthinking prejudice and attitudes built around ignorance, self-interest, and 
hierarchy.350 Law-trained specialists may find quiet-revolution rulings 
especially hard to swallow. The difficulty is that the very idea of “doing law”—
with its focus on rationality, internal consistency, and continuity over time—
seems in its nature to clash with the making of unreasoned ex cathedra 
pronouncements,351 especially by democratically unaccountable decision-
makers.352 Advocates of judicial reason-giving argue that the practice provides 
an essential source of legitimacy for American courts,353 especially in light of 
 
346  THE FEDERALIST NO. 72, at 489-90 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
347  THE FEDERALIST NO. 20, at 128 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
348  THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, at 355 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
349  See, e.g., ELY, supra note 302, at 60-63. 
350  See id. at 61 (noting, for example, long-standing traditions of racial discrimination). 
351  See Mathilde Cohen, When Judges Have Reasons Not to Give Reasons: A Comparative 
Law Approach, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 483, 486 (2015) (“More than other branches of 
government, judges are expected to be model reason-givers.”); Hart, supra note 295, at 99 
(focusing in part on need to establish legitimacy and importance of guiding future lawmaking 
in broadly endorsing judicial reason-giving); Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. 
REV. 633, 633-34 (1995) (observing that “[i]n law . . . giving reasons is seen as a necessary 
condition of rationality” and that “conventional picture . . . is one in which giving reasons is 
both the norm and the ideal”); Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 
HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1754 (1995) (“Reason-giving is usually prized in law, as of course it 
should be. Without reasons, there is no assurance that decisions are not arbitrary or 
irrational . . . .”); Wald, supra note 337, at 1372 (asserting that “litigants, lawyers, reviewing 
judges, the press, and ordinary citizens need to know why a particular judge came to a 
particular decision,” especially to achieve “consistency” in the law). 
352  See Cohen, supra note 351, at 507 (“Because life-tenured judges are not held 
accountable at the ballot box, their accountability stems from the reasoned explanations they 
produce.”); Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 
1278 (2009) (arguing that “public officials in a democracy can be held accountable by a 
requirement or expectation that they give reasoned explanations for their decisions”). 
353  See Randy Beck, Transtemporal Separation of Powers in the Law of Precedent, 87 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1405, 1426-27 (2012) (“When a court offers persuasive explanations 
for its decisions, its opinions tend to bolster the court’s legitimacy in the eyes of the public.”); 
Wald, supra note 337, at 1372 (“One of the few ways we have to justify our power to decide 
matters important to our fellow citizens is to explain why we decide as we do.”). But see 
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the nation’s deep-seated hostility to authoritarianism.354 In addition, so the 
argument goes, the process of openly articulating reasons disciplines decision-
makers, thus fostering a more accurate resolution of disputed questions,355 while 
also providing some assurance to those on the losing side that they received a 
fair shake.356 
Some observers will view these arguments for reason-giving as unconvincing 
or at least overstated. They will point out that many forms of decision-making 
do not call for any reason-giving at all357 and that some legal systems have 
eschewed the practice even in the work of appellate judges.358 The high courts 
of France, for example, almost always resolve legal issues with an essentially 
conclusionary application of a supposedly controlling codified text.359 Skeptics 
of reason-giving might add that proponents of the practice should be careful 
what they wish for. The underlying concern is that judges in actuality often do 
not give their real reasons for deciding cases as they do.360 From this perspective, 
quiet-revolution rulings at least offer the upside of not promoting judicial 
dissembling. 
This mix of potential reactions to quiet-revolution rulings raises hard 
questions about where even to begin in trying to assess their legitimacy. It may 
be, however, that one helpful starting point is near at hand—that is, in the lessons 
 
Michael Wells, French and American Judicial Opinions, 19 YALE J. INT’L L. 81, 84 (1994) 
(“The supposed benefits of the American form—in particular . . . legitimacy—may be largely 
illusory.”). 
354  See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 351, at 636-37 (“The act of giving a reason is the 
antithesis of authority.”). 
355  Beck, supra note 353, at 1426 (“Writing out one’s legal analysis serves as a discipline 
that can force judges to think more carefully and systematically about the issues in dispute.”); 
Cohen, supra note 351, at 511 (“In sum, the existence and availability of judicial reasons 
ensures that a wide variety of audiences can evaluate, discuss, follow, or criticize judicial 
decisions.”). 
356  See Cohen, supra note 351, at 506 (noting that perception that “decision maker has 
given ‘due consideration’ to the ‘respondent’s views and arguments’ is crucial to individuals’ 
acceptance of both the decision and the authority of the institution”). 
357  See, e.g., id. at 538-58 (discussing, for example, rejections of pardon applications and 
judicial denials of discretionary review); Schauer, supra note 351, at 636-39 (reviewing, 
similarly, rejections of pardon applications). 
358  See Cohen, supra note 351, at 486 (“Roman courts, ecclesiastical courts, and a number 
of aristocratic courts in premodern, continental Europe functioned without giving 
reasons . . . .”). Notably in this regard, the issuance of unpublished opinions and summary 
affirmances has been on the rise in the federal courts of appeals. 
359  Wells, supra note 353, at 92 (“Rather than a reasoned and candid essay, an opinion in 
the highest courts [in France] is a terse and opaque summary of the outcome and the reasons 
for it.”). 
360  See Michael L. Wells, “Sociological Legitimacy” in Supreme Court Opinions, 64 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1011, 1033 (2007). 
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to be gleaned from overarching theories of constitutional interpretation. Some 
analysts might question this idea. They could say, for example, that interpretive 
theory focuses on giving meaning to the Constitution, as opposed to structuring 
the Court’s decision-making practices, including with regard to the proper 
fashioning of its published opinions. It seems apparent, however, that matters 
concerning the Court’s articulation (or nonarticulation) of reasons have a close 
tie to interpretive methodologies since those methodologies focus specifically 
on how courts should reason in reaching interpretive results. Among other 
things, a citizenry that requires judges to decide matters based on particular sets 
of reasons—related to text, history, precedent, or whatever—cannot assess 
whether judges in fact are acting properly unless they openly put forward their 
justifications for their legal pronouncements. In addition, interpretive theories 
reflect deep understandings of the Court’s role in our system of governance, and 
those deep understandings are likely to cast light on a question as fundamental 
as whether judges should set forth reasons to support their pronouncements, 
especially in their most consequential—that is, their most “revolutionary”—
rulings. At the least, as we will see, the focus of some theorists on the centrality 
of judicial pragmatism in the decision-making process provides one useful point 
of focus in thinking about the justifiability of quiet-revolution rulings.361 None 
of this is to say that constitutional theory provides the only helpful basis for 
assessing the normative claims of quiet-revolution rulings or that adherents of 
one interpretive theory or another necessarily will line up for or against the 
issuance of unreasoned decisions. Even so, one might fairly and fruitfully ask: 
How do quiet-revolution rulings square with prevailing theories of constitutional 
interpretation? 
The subject of constitutional theory is laden with complexity. Even so, two 
major approaches dominate the scene. “Originalism,” which builds on the 
jurisprudential tradition of positivism,362 directs attention to the communicated 
dictates of the enactors of relevant texts as of the time those texts became law.363 
Although there are different styles of originalism, particularly with regard to 
how open its adherents are to characterizing original meaning at high levels of 
generality,364 a unifying theme runs through the work of all originalists. The 
 
361  See infra notes 408-409 and accompanying text. 
362  David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 
886 (1996) (discussing connection between positivism and originalism). 
363  Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States 
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 38 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (endorsing approach that 
focuses on “how the text of the Constitution was originally understood”—that is, “the original 
meaning of the text”). 
364  Compare, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 641, 646 (2013) (arguing in favor of “thin” theory of original meaning), 
and Steven G. Calabresi & Hannah M. Begley, Originalism and Same-Sex Marriage, 70 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 648, 706 (2016) (arguing that “originalist reading of the Fourteenth 
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original understanding of the contested constitutional text—often described in 
terms of “original public meaning”—is fixed and controlling.365 By way of 
example, almost all originalists read the Constitution as not establishing any 
constitutional right to secure an abortion. The reason why is that, in their view, 
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment was settled at the time of its 
ratification, and then-members of Congress, the state legislatures, and the 
general public did not have in mind that the Amendment would afford this type 
of protection.366 
In contrast to originalism stands the theory of interpretation sometimes 
described as “living constitutionalism.”367 This approach differs from 
originalism primarily because it authorizes judges to reach beyond historical 
understandings to consider the values reflected in ambiguous texts in light of 
changing knowledge, altered circumstances, and developing social 
conditions.368 Many adherents of living constitutionalism, for example, argue 
 
Amendment would require the Supreme Court to defend a right to same-sex marriage”), with 
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 862 (1989) (worrying 
that “the faint-hearted originalist” is no different from “the moderate nonoriginalist” because 
“former finds it comforting to make up (out of whole cloth) an original evolutionary intent”). 
See also DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 17 (2010) (observing that 
“fainthearted, or qualified, or sometime originalism . . . gives away most of the qualities that 
purported to make originalism appealing in the first place”). 
365 See, e.g.,  Jack M. Balkin, The Construction of Original Public Meaning, 31 CONST. 
COMMENT. 71, 73 (2016); see also ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE 
POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 144 (1990) (“Law is a public act. Secret reservations or 
intentions count for nothing. All that counts is how the words used in the Constitution would 
have been understood at the time.”). 
366 See  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 174 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“To reach its 
result, the Court necessarily has had to find within the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment a 
right that was apparently completely unknown to the drafters of the Amendment.”). 
367  James E. Fleming, Living Originalism and Living Constitutionalism as Moral Readings 
of the American Constitution, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1171, 1171 (2012); see also STRAUSS, supra 
note 364, at 1 (“A ‘living constitution’ is one that evolves, changes over time, and adapts to 
new circumstances, without being formally amended.”). It merits emphasis that some 
constitutional analysts will question the idea that only two theories of interpretation dominate 
modern constitutional law. Professor Richard Fallon, for example, has advanced a theory of 
interpretation that calls for a ranked judicial assessment of five interpretive influences, 
beginning with “arguments from text” and followed by “the framers’ intent, constitutional 
theory, precedent, and moral and policy values.” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist 
Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1189 (1987). 
Different constitutional thinkers are sure to view this approach in different ways. But some of 
them, especially those who gravitate to the originalist tradition, might well characterize it as 
embodying one form of “living constitutionalism,” especially in light of its openness to 
judicial consideration of morality- and policy-based considerations. 
368  See STRAUSS, supra note 364, at 112 (celebrating Framers’ use of language “general 
enough not to force on a society outcomes that are so unacceptable that they discredit the 
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that the Fourteenth Amendment’s tersely stated vindication of “due process of 
law” and “liberty” are properly understood today—whatever might have been 
thought by a select group of men in 1868—to authorize the distinctly “intimate 
and personal” decision of a woman to control her own body.369 Critics argue that 
this interpretive style permits judges to “determine what is or is not 
constitutional on the basis of their own appraisal of what laws are unwise or 
unnecessary.”370 But nonoriginalists respond by emphasizing that their approach 
is constrained by, among other things, an honoring of the same common-law 
tradition that informed the work of the Framers themselves.371 The result, they 
say, is a respectful attentiveness to “the accumulated wisdom of many 
generations,”372 including as reflected in “the specific intentions of the 
Framers”373 to the extent those intentions are identifiable.374 As a consequence, 
in the view of common-law constitutionalists, the work of the Court both must 
and does involve building, with lawyerly thoughtfulness and care, on “the 
elaborate body of law that has developed, mostly through judicial decisions, over 
the years.”375  
With these core principles of constitutional theory in view, what can be said 
about the worthiness of quiet-revolution rulings? How, in other words, does this 
form of decision-making map onto the now most prominent theories of 
constitutional interpretation? 
A. Quiet-Revolution Rulings and Constitutional Originalism  
As for originalism, the key points seem clear enough. This theory posits that 
constitutional texts set forth controlling principles established at, and only at, the 
 
document” and noting that “[t]here is reason to think that the framers were self-conscious 
about this”); Thurgood Marshall, Commentary, Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United 
States Constitution, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2 (1987) (“When contemporary Americans cite 
‘The Constitution,’ they invoke a concept that is vastly different from what the framers barely 
began to construct two centuries ago.”). 
369  Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
370  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 511-12 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). 
371  See STRAUSS, supra note 364, at 17; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME, JUDICIAL 
MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT, at xiii (1999) (“American constitutional law is rooted 
in the common law.”). In addition, some argue that undue judicial activism is constrained by 
political checks placed on the Court by the Framers’ constitutional plan, including because of 
the ever-looming possibilities of impeachment, jurisdiction-stripping, nonenforcement of 
judgments, court-packing, and the like. See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 156 
(2008). 
372  Strauss, supra note 362, at 892. 
373  Id. at 881 (building on this idea to claim that “[i]t is unusual for clear evidence of a 
specific intention to be disregarded”). 
374  STRAUSS, supra note 364, at 18 (“On the most practical level, it is often impossible to 
uncover what the original understandings were . . . .”). 
375  Strauss, supra note 362, at 877. 
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time those texts took effect.376 To be sure, those controlling principles are 
sometimes hard to discern, but even then courts must focus their energies on the 
process of discovery.377 More particularly, the analyst must consult historical 
materials to identify operative constitutional principles and then apply those 
principles (and only those principles) to decide the case at hand.378 Put simply, 
originalist judges must resolve constitutional disputes based on controlling 
reasons—that is, controlling history-based reasons that reveal the originally 
understood meaning of the relevant constitutional text.379 
With these organizing principles laid bare, there is reason to conclude that 
ipse dixit declarations, particularly in cases of revolutionary significance, create 
severe tensions with an originalism-driven view of constitutional law. In 
particular, as we have seen, originalism calls for the resolution of cases 
organized around a form of reason-giving centered on historical inquiry. Yet 
ipse dixit decision-making involves no giving of historical reasons or, indeed, 
any reasons at all.380 To be sure, some interpretive disputes might call for a result 
so clearly dictated by originalist principles that an originalism-minded Court 
would deem it unnecessary to justify its declaration of controlling law with a 
spelled-out rationale. In other words, the existence of “easy cases” might render 
 
376  See supra note 365 and accompanying text (highlighting fixed understanding of 
“original” meaning). 
377  See Scalia, supra note 363, at 38 (describing materials, historical in nature, to be 
consulted to determine original meaning). 
378  See id.; see also BORK, supra note 365, at 144. 
379  One important qualification merits mention. Sometimes, a principle ascribable to an 
originalist line of thinking will require a great deal of elaboration in the face of extremely 
sparse historical evidence. It might be, for example, that sound originalist analysis supports 
the Court’s recognition of the so-called dormant Commerce Clause principle. The historical 
evidence, however, may offer very little further guidance as to how that principle should 
operate in the many different contexts in which it might be invoked. Different originalists will 
deal with these sorts of open questions in different ways. It is predictable, if not certain, 
however, that they will have reasons of some kind for recognizing whatever sub-rules, 
exceptions, and the like that they deem operative. Of particular importance, to the extent the 
creation and application of such doctrinal elaborations reflect (whether explicitly or 
implicitly) the common-law method, the discussion of common-law constitutionalism offered 
below would seem to come into play. 
380  To be sure, many originalists—most notably, Justice Scalia—have deemed it proper to 
depart from an originalist view of constitutional commands so as to honor the principle of 
stare decisis in some contexts. See, e.g., W. Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 210 
(1994) (Scalia, J., concurring) (expressing willingness, “on stare decisis grounds, [to] enforce 
a self-executing ‘negative’ Commerce Clause” even while viewing that limit as unjustifiable 
on originalist grounds). Of course, there are reasons to honor precedent—reasons rooted in 
stability, humility, legal coherence, and the like. The point is that even originalists who “water 
down” their adherence to originalism-based principles by honoring precedent are acting on 
the basis of reasons and indeed no less so than more hardline adherents of the originalist 
approach. 
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the issuance of ipse dixit declarations reconcilable with the originalist 
methodology based on the common-sense idea that one need not state the 
obvious.381 In actuality, however, the Court’s past ipse dixit declarations cannot 
be explained based on this logic. To begin with, if an obvious originalist 
justification for a newly minted doctrine were to exist, one would expect the 
Court to spell out that justification precisely because it would be so easy to do 
so. Indeed, this is especially true because the originalist methodology is driven 
in large measure by worries about self-indulgent judicial inventiveness.382 Given 
this outlook, even if an obvious originalist explanation for a newly declared 
principle of law were to exist, an originalist Court should be strongly motivated 
to spell out that explanation so as to dispel any suspicion that it is “making,” 
rather than “interpreting,” the law. 
Examination of the Court’s actual catalog of ipse dixit declarations removes 
any doubt on this score. As we have seen, some ipse dixit declarations seem 
starkly at odds with—rather than clearly dictated by—the express directives of 
the constitutional text itself. The Court’s application of the First Amendment to 
decision-makers other than legislatures is illustrative.383 Other ipse dixit 
declarations, although potentially reconcilable with the text, appear nonetheless 
to stand in no small measure of tension with original understandings. By way of 
example, the conclusion that a corporation is a “person” for Fourteenth 
Amendment purposes is, at the very least, historically debatable.384 In fact, not 
a single ipse dixit declaration examined in this Article is readily explicable as 
involving an obvious application of originalist principles.  
Invitational pronouncements also raise problems for adherents of originalist 
theory. To be sure, it might be (for example) that a careful study of historical 
materials would reveal that the framing generation viewed the operation of free-
expression protections as closely bound up with whether regulated speech raises 
a “clear and present danger.” But if that is true, one would expect the Court, if it 
were of an originalist mindset, to have pointed to those materials as it enshrined 
this concept in the law. In Schenck and its progeny, however, the Court did no 
such thing, suggesting that the phrase was not so much meant to capture the 
public views of 1791 as it was meant to speak to the practical concerns of 
twentieth-century America. In the end, the originalist approach centers on 
limiting judicial power by requiring that exercises of that power have their 
source in the giving of reasons centered on historical understandings.385 Yet, as 
the Court’s work with the “clear and present danger” standard illustrates, 
invitational pronouncements are just as “quiet” in this respect as ipse dixit 
 
381  For a detailed treatment of the phenomenon of “easy cases,” see generally Frederick 
Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985). 
382  See supra note 370 and accompanying text (highlighting expression of this view by 
Justice Black in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965)). 
383  See supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
384  See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text. 
385  See supra notes 363, 365, and accompanying text. 
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declarations. Thus, the former, no less than the latter, seems to stand in tension 
with the originalist methodology. 
B. Quiet-Revolution Rulings and Common-Law Constitutionalism 
As we have seen, both ipse dixit declarations and invitational pronouncements 
present serious concerns for the originalist school of thought because they come 
into the law untethered to a history-based—or, indeed, any—rationale. These 
same concerns, however, may not apply so obviously in the world of common-
law constitutionalism because that methodology can be seen as being in its 
nature more adaptive, flexible, and pragmatic than the originalist approach. Does 
that mean that quiet-revolution rulings readily comport with the common-law 
constitutionalism? Hardly.  
The keystone point is that the unfolding of the common law centers on judicial 
work with reasons.386 At the heart of even the first year of law school lies the 
meticulous study of how to apply common-law doctrines—in large part by 
distinguishing or analogizing past case rulings—based on their underlying 
rationales.387 Particularly telling is the honored mantra of the common law that 
“[t]he rule follows where its reason leads; where the reason stops, there stops the 
rule.”388 All of this suggests that the same central problem that originalists have 
with quiet-revolution rulings may well be shared by common-law 
constitutionalists. To be sure, nonoriginalists do not insist on giving history-
based reasons to support judicial pronouncements. Even so—and precisely 
because of the reason-centered nature of the common-law method—they would 
seem (at least at first blush) duty-bound to demand the giving of some reasons 
of some kind in support of the Court’s pronouncements. Simply put, the 
declaration of rules without reasons seems at loggerheads with a decision-
making methodology—that is, the common-law methodology—that is deeply 
committed to the giving and use of reasons.389  
 
386  See generally Robert S. Summers, Two Types of Substantive Reasons: The Core of a 
Theory of Common-Law Justification, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 707 (1978). 
387  See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 351, at 644 (“[I]n the standard law school socratic 
dialogue . . . a student, asked to give a reason for an assertion, is bombarded with an array of 
carefully crafted hypotheticals designed to test the student’s commitment to the reason as well 
as to the general result.”). To be sure, common-law courts sometimes decide cases not by 
investigating and then drawing upon the reasons that gave rise to relevant precedents but 
instead by abandoning those precedents altogether. Even then, however, the retrenchment 
ordinarily comes to pass because intervening judicial decisions, changed circumstances, or 
evolving societal understandings offer reasons for ringing out the old and ringing in the new. 
388  KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: THE CLASSIC LECTURES ON THE LAW AND 
LAW SCHOOL 174 (Oxford Univ. Press 2008) (emphasis omitted); see also Hart, supra note 
295, at 125 (stating that “reason is the life of the law”). 
389  See Hart, supra note 295, at 99 (tying Court’s need to offer reasons in part to “the 
thrilling tradition of Anglo-American law”). 
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This line of analysis casts a long shadow over ipse dixit declarations, 
including for common-law constitutionalists. But, upon close inspection, 
invitational pronouncements may well not pose the same set of problems. The 
distinction arises because ipse dixit declarations inject entirely new doctrines 
into the law without offering any reasons on their behalf. In contrast, invitational 
pronouncements come into the law because they are themselves a part of the 
reasoning that is offered to justify a non-ipse dixit ruling. To be sure, passages 
that embody invitational pronouncements themselves find their way into judicial 
opinions without explanation about their origins or soundness, thus rendering 
them “quiet” in a significant respect. But that is in the nature of common-law 
decision-making, within which the giving of “reasons for the reasons” inevitably 
must reach a stopping point.390 When the Court in Schenck spun out the “clear 
and present danger” formulation, for example, it did not profess to be stating a 
rule of law at all, and it offered no background reasons—apart from reasons 
discernible on the face of things from common sense—about where that 
formulation had come from. What is more, the cryptic nature and unspoken 
source of the phrase joined together to render it able to support a range of 
extrapolations in the future—which over time, in keeping with the common-law 
method, is exactly what it did.  
Put simply, the Court in Schenck made a suggestive, though modest, move in 
setting forth the “clear and present danger” formulation. A seed was planted. But 
that seed might or might not have later sprung to life. A trial balloon went up, 
but the experiment could have played out in very different ways. Everything 
depended—as it should have, from a common-law constitutionalist 
perspective—on shifting insights and social conditions, together with the 
Court’s ever better-informed observation of how its own developing doctrine 
was playing out in the real world. In short, invitational pronouncements fit nicely 
within the common-law tradition, through which the law is continuously 
working itself out—always building on the past but moving in new directions 
here and there—in a pragmatic process of unfolding over time. 
What about ipse dixit declarations? It may be that common-law-oriented 
judges, unconstrained by the dictates of historical understandings, sometimes 
encounter “the power of the idea whose time has come.”391 In turn, they may see 
fit to put forward that idea in a form that suggests it is axiomatic. To the extent 
that judges do so by way of ipse dixit declarations, however, widespread 
understandings about the common law method raise a serious, if not insuperable, 
 
390  See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY 26e-27e (G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H. von 
Wright eds., Denis Paul & G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1969) (“At some point one has to pass 
from explanation to mere description . . . . To be sure there is justification; but justification 
comes to an end.”). 
391  This quotation comes from civil rights pioneer Diane Nash and is engraved on the wall 
of the Birmingham Civil Rights Institute in Birmingham, Alabama. See also Interview by 
Blackside, Inc. with Diane Nash, in Chi., Ill. (Nov. 12, 1985), http://digital.wustl.edu/e/eop 
/eopweb/nas0015.0267.075dianenash.html [https://perma.cc/9Q6U-FZWR] (transcript). 
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difficulty. To repeat: The common law method has at its core the idea that rules 
must be based on a thoughtful invocation of persuasive reasons. Ipse dixit 
declarations, however, involve the announcement of new rules without the 
giving of any supportive reasons at all. Ipse dixit declarations thus seem to run 
counter to the premises of the common law and (so it logically follows) of 
common-law constitutionalism.  
One problem with this line of thinking may be that its portrayal of the 
common law is too simplistic, if not wildly romantic. On this view, the law of 
contracts, torts, and property has been the product of all sorts of judicial 
decisions—some long, some short, some thorough, some superficial, some 
elaborate in their reasoning, some impenetrable and cryptic. If this depiction of 
things is accurate, it should follow that ipse dixit declarations do not depart from 
the spirit of common-law decision-making. To the contrary, they would seem to 
reflect a natural and predictable product of constitutional law’s linkage to the 
common-law tradition.  
One sticky wicket, however, is that quiet-revolution rulings, by definition, are 
revolutionary. It is one thing for courts to dispose of garden-variety problems—
whether in constitutional or nonconstitutional cases—in unreasoned, perhaps 
hurried-along, pronouncements.392 But the ipse dixit declarations brought to the 
surface here—for example, in Gitlow and its progeny, Santa Clara County, 
Friedman-Harry Marks Clothing, Co., and the post-Bolling reverse-
incorporation cases—are constitutional landmarks. Widely accepted 
justifications for favoring judicial reason-giving, such as those centered on 
fostering legitimacy and avoiding the appearance of authoritarianism,393 seem 
especially weighty in this set of cases. Put simply, for most observers, the 
Court’s unreasoned resolution of the most legally and socially salient 
constitutional cases is unlikely to engender a peaceful, easy feeling. 
A related point is that the common law itself may have changed, and may still 
be changing, in a way that causes ipse dixit pronouncements to be in heightened 
tension with common-law norms. Once upon a time, according to this account, 
courts may have seen fit to reformulate doctrine in dramatic respects by way of 
tour de force pronouncements or the anything-goes use of legal fictions. In the 
present day, however, it is standard practice for analysts to assault the reasoning 
of common-law judges who make these kinds of moves as conclusionary, 
circular, disingenuous, or question-begging.394 The consequence, so this 
portrayal of things suggests, is that good judges nowadays work hard to give 
reasons and thus avoid the attachment of these condemnatory labels to their 
work. Historians and others might wish to take a look at whether this account of 
 
392  Indeed, one might say that disposing of such cases in such a way is justifiable precisely 
because it allows courts to deal more thoroughly with the very sort of higher-stakes issues 
that are the subject of quiet-revolution rulings. 
393  See supra notes 351-354 and accompanying text (discussing these justifications). 
394  See, e.g., Schauer, supra note 351, at 633 (“Results unaccompanied by reasons are 
typically castigated as deficient.”). 
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previous and present-day judicial practice corresponds with the facts. But if such 
a shift in the work of common-law decision-makers has occurred, or even if 
sound policy dictates that such a shift should occur, it would seem to follow that 
common-law constitutionalists will look askance at quiet-revolution rulings of 
the ipse dixit sort. 
Might it be, however, that the case for common-law-type reason-giving does 
not carry over to the Court’s work with constitutional law? In other words, might 
it be that constitutional cases differ from nonconstitutional cases in such a way 
that a greater acceptance of reasonless decision-making should apply when it 
comes to ipse dixit declarations that arise in the constitutional context? Of no 
small relevance in this regard is the idea, championed most prominently by 
Professor Cass Sunstein, that the Court should bring a “minimalist” style of 
decision-making to its constitutional work.395 On this view, many (if not most) 
constitutional questions are best resolved by way of decisions that lack both 
“breadth” and “depth.”396 Instead, the Court’s rulings should be “narrow” in the 
sense that they decide not much more than “the case at hand.”397 And, of more 
importance for present purposes, they should be “shallow” in the sense that they 
are “unaccompanied by abstract accounts about what accounts for those 
judgments.”398  
This approach makes sense, according to Sunstein, because short and cautious 
steps are preferable to long and bold ones as the Court deals with the sort of 
foundational constitutional disputes that often sharply divide the public.399 The 
minimalist style, he argues, also contributes to a healthy dialogue between the 
Court and nonjudicial actors, including by sometimes forcing elected officials 
to focus on issues they otherwise might prefer to sweep under the rug.400 At the 
same time, judicial minimalism helps the Court maintain its good standing by 
keeping it from alienating large segments of the citizenry by pushing the law in 
any one direction too far, too fast.401 Against this backdrop, it might seem that 
ipse dixit constitutional declarations have a special claim to legitimacy because, 
at least in terms of “shallowness,” they fit hand-in-glove with the minimalist 
philosophy. At the core of that philosophy, after all, is the celebration of 
constitutional rulings that have an “incompletely theorized” character.402 And if 
any ruling is incompletely theorized, it is the ipse dixit ruling that lacks any 
theorizing at all. 
 
395  See SUNSTEIN, supra note 371, at 1. 
396  Id. at 10-11. 
397  Id. at 10. 
398  Id. at 13 (emphasis omitted). 
399  See Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Minimalism, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1899, 1903 (2006). 
400  See SUNSTEIN, supra note 371, at 259 (highlighting potential value of minimalist rulings 
in “spurring the processes of democratic deliberation”). 
401 Id. at 14. 
402  Id. at 11. 
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Even Sunstein, however, suggests that courts should give at least some 
reasons as they set forth case-deciding legal principles, stating that “[t]here is a 
big difference between a refusal to give an ambitious argument for an outcome 
and a refusal to give any reasons at all.”403 This view of things circles us back to 
the basic arguments for judicial reason-giving. If openness and accountability in 
government are virtues, if reason-giving is central to shaping the course of the 
law, if the unexplained assertion is especially worrisome when it comes from 
unelected judges, and if justification is most logically required when the Court 
issues rulings not open to legislative correction, then ipse dixit declarations in 
constitutional cases should be greeted with no small measure of worry.404 
Building on this idea, Professor Sunstein might well hesitate to endorse some of 
the Court’s most prominent ipse dixit declarations—for example, its wholly 
unexplained rulings on commercial speech in Chrestensen and on corporate 
personhood in Santa Clara County.405 
But are there ever instances in which ipse dixit declarations are justifiable? 
Consider Gitlow, where—unlike in Chrestensen and Santa Clara County—the 
Court at least dropped a footnote in which it cited several earlier rulings that had 
read the Due Process Clause to protect “fundamental rights.”406 To be sure, there 
was no discussion in the footnote, or anywhere in Gitlow, about what 
“fundamental-ness” entails or about why free-expression rights should fall on 
the fundamental-rights, rather than the nonfundamental-rights, side of the 
constitutional dividing line. The Court’s string-cite, however, provided at least 
the hint of an underlying rationale for the Justices’ treatment of the incorporation 
question, and this feature of Gitlow brings into focus two significant points. 
First, every constitutional ruling in actuality lies somewhere on a spectrum that 
ranges from the totally quiet to the totally loud.407 Second, sometimes a quiet-
 
403  Id. at 13; see id. at 15-16 (indicating that some reason-giving is “too shallow” and thus 
neither “adequate to justify the outcome” nor compliant with “norms associated with the legal 
craft”). 
404  See supra notes 351-356 and accompanying text. 
405  See supra notes 85-87, 231, and accompanying text. 
406  Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 n.9 (1925). 
407  This point is well illustrated by important decisions of the Court in the field of 
administrative law. Particularly notable is United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 
U.S. 742 (1972), in which the Court dramatically narrowed the range of cases in which 
governing law required agency officials to engage in formal rulemaking. As Professor Barnett 
has documented, “Whatever the policy merits of formal rulemaking, the Court’s sua sponte 
rejection of formal rulemaking was perfunctory, relied upon unpersuasive authorities, and 
failed to account for formal rulemaking’s consistent historical understandings and use.” Kent 
Barnett, How the Supreme Court Derailed Formal Rulemaking, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
ARGUENDO 1, 2 (2017). Even more notably, it turns out that perhaps the most prominent of 
all the Court’s administrative-law rulings, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), embodies the characteristics of an ipse dixit declaration 
in important respects. To be sure, it would be inaccurate to say that the Court supplied no 
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revolution ruling will, on close inspection, prove to be less quiet than a first 
impression might suggest because that ruling draws upon, even if implicitly, 
principles set forth in earlier decisions. Notwithstanding these qualifications, 
Gitlow occupies a space so close to the endpoint of the quiet-to-loud continuum 
that it should raise deep difficulties for anyone who views it as a necessary 
ingredient of credible judicial work that the court make at least some minimal 
effort at reason-giving.  
The foregoing discussion suggests that judicial minimalism offers little in the 
way of support for ipse dixit constitutional rulings. There is, however, another 
concept connected up with the common-law approach to constitutional 
interpretation that may lend support to the Court’s issuance of some ipse dixit 
declarations—namely, the concept of “pragmatism.”408 At the least, pragmatic 
considerations—considerations tied, in this instance, to the well-functioning 
operation of the Court—provide the most plausible justification for its 
occasional issuance of ipse dixit declarations.409 
Consider again the ipse dixit declaration, set forth in the Gitlow line of cases, 
to the effect that the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Free Speech and 
Free Press Clauses. Whether the Court took a wrong turn in issuing this 
unreasoned ruling might well hinge, from a pragmatist’s point of view, on the 
mix of options the Court then confronted. More specifically, one can imagine a 
 
justification for the deferential two-part test of agency authority articulated in that case. Even 
so, as Professor Thomas Merrill has explained, the ruling “was considered routine by those 
who made it” and was “little noticed when it was decided.” Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of 
Chevron: The Making of an Accidental Landmark, 66 ADMIN. L. REV. 253, 257 (2014). In 
part this was the case because no member of the Court authored a dissenting or other separate 
opinion, perhaps because only six Justices participated in the ruling. As for the arguments 
presented to the Court by counsel, there was “nothing in the merits briefs to suggest that the 
case was seen as a vehicle for a major statement about statutory interpretation.” Id. at 268. 
And most important of all, “[t]here is no evidence that Justice Stevens understood his 
handiwork in Chevron as announcing fundamental changes in the law,” id. at 275, or that any 
one of his “colleagues on the Court perceived Chevron as some kind of watershed decision.” 
Id. at 276. In fact, “after Chevron was decided, Justice Stevens himself authored opinions that 
analyzed agency interpretations using the traditional factors approach that preceded 
Chevron,” and he later stated publicly that “he regarded it as simply a restatement of existing 
law.” Id. at 275. In short, Chevron brought a “profound” change to American administrative-
law doctrine, even though “the Court that rendered this decision had utterly no intention of 
producing such a decision,” id. at 283, thus rendering the case’s later impact fairly described 
as an “accident.” Id. at 282. 
408  RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 1 (2003) (asserting that 
“pragmatism is the best description of the American judicial ethos and also the best guide to 
the improvement of judicial performance”); see also Cohen, supra note 351, at 490 (arguing 
that judges must “compromise between reason-giving and other values”). 
409  See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 371, at 57 (suggesting that sometimes minimalist 
reasoning “will not be so much desirable as inevitable” because it provides the only way to 
generate a majority opinion). 
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world in which an elaborate consideration of the incorporation issue would have 
caused the Court to splinter. Some Justices, for example, might have concluded 
that expression rights were sufficiently “fundamental” to merit application to the 
states while taking no position on whether other rights merited this description. 
Another set of Justices may have been unwilling to endorse any ratio decidendi 
other than one founded on the principle of total incorporation. Still others might 
have concluded that the Due Process Clause supported incorporation only of 
“procedural” rights, while characterizing expressive liberties as procedural 
because of the special role they play in facilitating republican self-government. 
Another Justice or two might have seen the Free Speech and Free Press Clause 
guarantees as so central to personal self-realization that they had a one-of-a-kind 
claim to incorporation. A remaining set of Justices, although convinced that the 
clauses merited incorporation, might have had a sufficient level of uncertainty 
about all these approaches that they were unwilling to sign on to any of them. 
On top of all this, some Justices (perhaps even a majority) might have expressed 
an unwillingness to endorse any more-than-conclusionary rationale unless it 
tilted in the direction of their preferred theory—for example, by including, for 
some, a strong statement about the presumptive non-incorporation of other rights 
or, for others, the endorsement of a presumption of exactly the opposite sort.  
The broader point is that sometimes the construction of a meaningfully 
reasoned treatment of a constitutional issue will stir up a hornet’s nest of 
controversy within the Court, pushing it in the direction of issuing the sort of 
fractionated ruling that members of the legal profession routinely decry.410 
Members of the profession who bemoan fractionated rulings, however, tend to 
underestimate how powerful the pressures to issue such rulings can be. Indeed, 
at least six separate forces conjoin in many cases to push the Justices in this 
direction. 
First, the cases heard by the Court are almost always challenging and divisive. 
Most grants of certiorari arise because of conflicts in the lower courts,411 and 
typically these “conflicts arise because the legal issue is hard.”412 In the present 
day, most cases that manage to move all the way to oral argument in lower 
appellate courts present some measure of complexity.413 Levels of difficulty 
 
410  As to the views of the profession, see Thomas B. Bennett et al., Divide & Concur: 
Separate Opinions & Legal Change, 103 CORNELL L. REV. 817, 837-38, 845 (2018) (noting 
practical difficulties raised by concurrences in no-majority cases, with result that 
“[c]ommentators are virtually uniform in contempt for [them] on this score”); Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 804 (1982) (citing prior 
scholarship indicating that many observers view plurality opinions with “special scorn”). 
411  See, e.g., Emily Grant, Scott A. Henderson & Michael S. Lynch, The Ideological 
Divide: Conflict and the Supreme Court’s Certiorari Decision, 60 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 559, 
568-69 (2012). 
412  Easterbrook, supra note 410, at 806. 
413  See id. (noting tendency toward settlement when results seem clear). 
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increase enormously, however, when attention shifts to only those cases singled 
out for review by the high Court precisely because they are so vexing.414 
Second, as the hypothetical about First Amendment incorporation highlights, 
it is common for cases that reach the Court to invite more than two analytical 
approaches for resolving the issue at hand. Even when the Court confronts an 
essentially binary decision, complications in the opinion-writing process can 
arise—for example, with regard to how broadly or narrowly to spell out the 
governing principle. But, as Judge Easterbook has explained, the difficulty of 
forging a majority position among the Justices is profoundly magnified when 
three or more pathways to resolving the disputed issue come into play.415 
Third, the generation of majority opinions is especially tricky for a nine-
member decision-making body. A single judge has a single mind. For a three-
judge court, an approach that works for two members is typically discoverable. 
Finding a way forward among nine judges is far more complex. Among other 
things, within a three-member court, at most three analytical approaches can 
surface. Among nine Justices, the emergence of more than three preferred 
approaches—each held with differing levels of intensity—is always a 
possibility.416  
Fourth, a likelihood of disagreement is baked into the case-deciding process 
by the appointment and selection process for Supreme Court Justices.417 
Presidents appoint Justices for reasons connected up with ideology, and 
Presidents change on a regular basis, while Justices almost always serve for far 
longer stretches of time. Resulting dynamics within the Court are (to say the 
least) complex. But the bottom line is that Justices who have widely different 
views of many matters almost always serve together. And Justices do not 
become Justices by being shrinking violets. Building consensus among nine 
such decision-makers presents inevitable challenges.418 
Fifth, long-standing and essential operating norms within the Court contribute 
to the difficulty of creating a majority position for each case the Court hears. 
 
414  See id. (highlighting inexorable push toward Court’s being “inundated with tricky, 
division-creating problems”). 
415  See id. at 815 (highlighting decisional difficulties where “there are more than two 
possible outcomes and different voters do not rank the outcomes in the same order”). 
416  See SUNSTEIN, supra note 371, at 4 (“It may be very hard . . . to obtain a ruling . . . on 
a multimember court, consisting of diverse people who disagree on a great deal.”); id. at 57 
(adding that “minimalism may be the only route for a multi-member tribunal [to bridge] many 
disagreements”). 
417  Easterbrook, supra note 410, at 827-28 (noting that “appointment process ensures that 
the Justices will have multi-peaked responses to many issues” and that their recurring inability 
“to reach agreement on fundamental principles of constitutional interpretation” mirrors same 
lack of “agreement on such matters within the legal profession”). 
418  See Paul H. Edelman, David E. Klein & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Consensus, Disorder, 
and Ideology on the Supreme Court, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 129, 144-45 (2012) 
(examining influence of ideology in cases with dissensus). 
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Legislative bodies, for example, deal with the difficulties of forming majorities 
by authorizing, if not celebrating, logrolling and vote-trading as part of their 
decision-making processes. In contrast, the principled nature of judicial 
decision-making rightly takes away from the Court these tools for forging five-
Justice positions.419 Also in the picture is the accepted idea that Justices are duty-
bound to show “candor” in their reason-giving.420 This foundational notion, 
however, is inherently in tension with calls for the Justices to avoid the 
expression of differing views in fractionated rulings.421 Again, how all of this 
plays out in the operation of the Court is highly complex. But the norm of candor 
in some instances ensures that no majority will be able to come together to 
support a single case-resolving rationale. 
Finally, there exists the pressure of time. Especially as the annual term of the 
Court moves to its end, the felt need to resolve argued cases mounts. As a result, 
the Justices must not only work their way through internal disagreements; they 
must race against the clock.422 Refusing to join a circulated would-be majority 
opinion—including by doing nothing more than cryptically “concurring in the 
judgment”—may provide a ready mechanism to help simply get things done.423 
But such actions also can thwart the coming together of five Justices in a 
coherent ruling.  
All of these forces combine to push the Justices toward issuing multiple 
opinions in any given case. And that is not always a bad thing. Concurring 
opinions have value, and the sky does not fall every time the Court resolves a 
matter without generating a majority-supported rationale.424 This is the case in 
part because there is a body of law—focused on honoring the lowest common 
denominator of fractionated rulings—that often allows those rulings to operate 
as helpful, law-clarifying precedents.425 In some instances, however, it is 
 
419  In addition, there exists within the Court no one remotely like (for example) the Speaker 
of the House or the Majority Leader of the Senate, who have at their disposal managerial tools 
for fostering party discipline and otherwise incentivizing the creation of majorities. 
420  See Suzanna Sherry, The Four Pillars of Constitutional Doctrine, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 
969, 973 (2011). See generally David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. 
L. REV. 731 (1987). 
421  See Easterbrook, supra note 410, at 811 (rejecting view that fractionated rulings result 
from “Justices’ sloth or lack of aptitude”; instead “they go hand in hand with the attempts at 
reasoned explanation that most . . . critics [of fractionated rulings] endorse”). 
422  See Hart, supra note 295, at 84 (asserting, albeit in 1959, that in light of time constraints 
“Court has more work to do than it is able to do in the way in which the work ought to be 
done”). 
423  See Greg Goelzhauser, Silent Concurrences, 31 CONST. COMMENT. 351, 356 (2016). 
424  See Bennett et al., supra note 410, at 823 (arguing that such opinions heighten “judicial 
transparency,” even if “at the cost of clarity”). But see Cohen, supra note 351, at 517 
(observing that issuance of “separate opinions may not only have divisive effects on the 
public, it may also aggravate divisions within a court itself”). 
425  See, e.g., Marks v. United States, 420 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). 
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difficult to distill governing principles from multi-opinion rulings.426 On 
occasion, it is all but impossible.427 Resulting uncertainties raise tensions with 
the Court’s core function of clarifying federal law.428 Nor are “the Court’s 
displays of division . . . costless.”429 Lower courts must struggle to squeeze out 
the controlling effects of multipart Supreme Court rulings.430 So, too, must 
ordinary citizens who are required to respond to the dictates of the Court in the 
real world. Perhaps for these reasons, Chief Justice Roberts has been especially 
vocal in expressing a desire to build greater consensus in the Court’s work.431 In 
pursuing this objective, the Chief Justice might do well to think about the 
potential usefulness of ipse dixit declarations. In particular, it could be that 
unexplained (or essentially unexplained) legal pronouncements handed down by 
a majority of the Court—that is, the stuff of ipse dixit declarations—sometimes 
have a useful role to play precisely because they mask underlying 
disagreements.432 
 
426  Sonja R. West, Concurring in Part & Concurring in the Confusion, 104 MICH. L. REV. 
1951, 1954 (2006) (“As the Branzburg case demonstrates, courts and commentators are 
confused about the proper interpretation and use of pseudo-concurrences.”). 
427  An illustration is provided (at least arguably) by the Court’s ruling in Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 267 (1978). In Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932, 940 (5th 
Cir. 1996), the Fifth Circuit concluded that Bakke did not support use of the “Harvard Plan” 
approach to race-conscious university admissions. The court relied squarely on the Bakke 
ruling’s failure to generate a majority opinion. See id. at 944. In particular, the Court reasoned 
that, while five Justices deemed the Harvard Plan approach to be permissible, those same five 
Justices did not embrace the same rationale for reaching that result. See id. Hopwood 
generated widespread criticism. The key point here, however, is that—whatever one thinks 
about the Court’s analysis in that case—it was the failure of the Court to produce a majority 
opinion in Bakke that opened the door to the ruling in Hopwood. 
428  See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the Supreme 
Court’s Responsibilities: An Empirical Study, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 717 (1984) (noting 
Court’s “unique position as the only institution in our society capable of an authoritative, final 
judicial resolution of a controversy governed by federal law”). 
429  Easterbrook, supra note 410, at 811. 
430  For one example of concerns of this kind, see Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 
U.S. 200, 221 (1995) (noting that “[l]ower courts found this lack of guidance [created by 
fractionated affirmative-action rulings] unsettling”). 
431  See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts to be Chief Justice of 
the United States: Hearing Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 371 (2005) 
(statement of nominee) (“I think one of the things that the Chief Justice should have as a top 
priority is to try to bring about a greater degree of coherence and consensus in the opinions of 
the Court.”); Adam Liptak, A Supreme Court Not So Much Deadlocked as Diminished, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 18, 2016, at A1 (noting Justice Kagan’s observation that “chief justice . . . is 
concerned about consensus building”). 
432  SUNSTEIN, supra note 371, at 13 (noting possibility that even “Judges who 
disagree . . . about the foundations of constitutional rights . . . might be well able to agree on 
how particular cases should be handled”); Cohen, supra note 351, at 514 (noting that 
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Skeptics might respond by observing that the present-day Court has better 
ways to deal with highly divisive cases than to issue reasonless declarations. In 
particular, because the Justices now have all but plenary control over their 
docket, they can (unlike in bygone days) artfully dodge those cases in which 
forging a majority opinion is most difficult by simply denying at the outset the 
petition for the writ of certiorari. In addition, even if such a messy case makes it 
to the full-argument stage, the Court can solve the problem by dismissing the 
writ as improvidently granted. At the least, these analysts might say, the Court 
should use these devices to avoid unreasoned rulings in the most important 
cases—that is, the very set of cases that produce quiet-revolution rulings. 
These points are fair ones, but countervailing considerations are in the picture, 
too. Consider again our hypothetical Justices’ struggle with how to deal with 
their bevy of views on whether and how to incorporate the Free Speech and Free 
Press Clauses into the Fourteenth Amendment. To be sure, that Court might have 
ducked the question, perhaps (if then possible) by declining to decide that case 
on the merits. But even if a decision in the case thereby became unnecessary, 
the underlying question was not about to go away. Indeed, in our hypothesized 
case, the incorporation issue was all but guaranteed to surface again and again 
in lower-court litigation.433 Justice Brandeis famously declared that “it is more 
important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”434 
A corollary might state that it is better to settle the applicable rule of law, and to 
settle it right, than not to settle it at all. In addition, while some observers may 
find the unreasoned disposition of highly important issues to be especially 
distasteful, it might be that the very importance of those issues creates the most 
pressing need for immediate resolution. In our hypothetical case, for example, 
one can imagine the Justices collaboratively agreeing that a prompt resolution 
of the contested incorporation question was in the best interest of the country 
even though they could not collaboratively agree on a unifying ratio decidendi. 
Those same Justices, perhaps with the encouragement of the Chief Justice, also 
might have concluded that it would be wise for the Court to address the issue in 
a unanimous or nearly unanimous ruling precisely because the issue was so 
important. And given the widely different views of the different Justices, the 
only way to reach that result would be to issue an ipse dixit declaration. 
 
“different individuals are more likely to agree on outcomes than on reasons”); Archibald Cox, 
The Supreme Court, 1979 Term—Foreword: Freedom of Expression in the Burger Court, 94 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 72 (1980) (reasoning that “greater effort to obtain consensus, perhaps by 
shortening opinions and limiting them to points of common agreement, might beneficially 
reduce the volume of concurring and separate opinions”); Easterbrook, supra note 410, at 
807. 
433  With regard to this particular issue, also in the picture was the presence of earlier 
precedent that likely would steer the lower courts to deem incorporation improper, even 
though (according to the hypothetical) that view had since been abandoned by a majority of 
the Court. See supra notes 33, 53, and accompanying text. 
434 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), 
overruled by Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938). 
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This discussion is not meant to suggest that only adherents of common-law 
constitutionalism should or will sign on to future ipse dixit declarations. To be 
sure, the common law’s focus on flexibility and pragmatism may render 
common-law constitutionalists distinctly open to the possibility of joining such 
rulings. But originalist Justices also must operate within the Court’s complex 
multi-judge community, and sometimes they may see their way to joining an 
unreasoned opinion, at least if the result is reconcilable with their own history-
centered thinking. This discussion, even more emphatically, is not meant to set 
forth a broad defense of ipse dixit declarations. To the contrary, as we have seen, 
both originalists and nonoriginalists are likely to agree in large numbers that the 
Justices should make every effort in every case to justify in an open way the 
rules of law they lay down. Even so, these efforts may fail in exceptional cases, 
thus producing a situation in which the Court may choose to establish a new 
rule—even a revolutionary new rule—without offering meaningful reasons on 
its behalf. The most critical point is that the Court should always think hard 
about the prospect of taking action of this kind. If the Justices do choose to issue 
an unreasoned quiet-revolution ruling, they should have good reasons for doing 
so. 
CONCLUSION 
Quiet-revolution rulings in constitutional law have been both common and 
important. Indeed, as this Article shows, they have transformed constitutional 
doctrine regarding such diverse subjects as incorporation, reverse incorporation, 
corporate personhood, equal protection, freedom of speech, freedom of religion, 
congressional powers, federal court jurisdiction, and means-ends analysis in all 
of its many rights-defining dimensions. No one has previously looked at these 
cases as a unitary whole, perhaps because the very quietness of these rulings has 
tended to keep them out of view. Examining these rulings in a systematic way, 
however, raises key questions about both our constitutional past and our 
constitutional future.  
One question about the future centers on whether the Court should abandon 
quiet-revolution rulings because they unjustifiably depart from its ordinary 
practice of supporting its rulings with an open articulation of reasons. As Part 
IV suggests, the issuance of invitational pronouncements typically can be seen 
as fitting within this ordinary practice because these pronouncements come into 
the law as part of the very giving of reasons that the Court offers in resolving 
the case at hand. The same cannot be said of ipse dixit declarations, however, 
because they set forth new and specific rules of law. Even so, as Part IV shows, 
the issuance of ipse dixit declarations (or rulings closely akin to such 
declarations) may sometimes prove helpful—if not indispensable—as the Court 
seeks to avert handing down a confusing patchwork of non-majority opinions in 
ruling on an important case. 
The analysis set forth in this Article also raises new questions about how both 
courts and lawyers should approach past quiet-revolution rulings in the future. 
One question involves whether the Court should devise specialized stare decisis 
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rules to deal with quiet-revolution precedents. Another question concerns 
whether courts should be particularly open to the possibility of limiting the 
operation of quiet-revolution precedents, even if an outright overruling is not 
possible.435 To be sure, some observers might wonder whether quiet-revolution 
rulings matter much in the real world. After all, the Supreme Court can abandon 
any one of these precedents whenever it wants to; indeed, it can abandon such 
precedents more easily than other precedents precisely because it can point to 
the earlier ruling’s unreasoned character as a reason for doing so. Any effort to 
minimize the significance of the Court’s quiet-revolution rulings based on their 
susceptibility to overruling, however, rests on feet of clay. In part this is true 
because many quiet-revolution precedents—such as the Court’s rulings on First 
Amendment incorporation—now stand at the center of such sprawling realms of 
doctrine that it is all but unthinkable that the Court would cast them aside. In any 
event, each of the Court’s quiet-revolution precedents—no less than each of its 
loud ones—binds the lower courts until that precedent is discarded by the Court, 
thus shaping in the meantime the real-world impact of the law in far-reaching 
ways in every corner of the nation. 
A look at the Court’s quiet-revolution rulings also raises questions for those 
who think most deeply about the Court as an institution. One question brought 
into focus by this Article concerns whether this set of rulings supports (and 
perhaps strongly supports) the idea that a common-law approach to 
constitutional decision-making has dominated the Court’s past work. To be sure, 
as Part III highlights, recent developments in both law and culture may portend 
a decline in rulings of this sort. But if the past is prologue to the future, pressures 
to issue quiet-revolution rulings will continue to arise. As the Supreme Court 
deals with those pressures, it will have no choice but to evaluate in individual 
cases whether the benefits of issuing such rulings outweigh their built-in costs. 
Perhaps the Court is destined to move away from the future issuance of quiet-
revolution rulings. In considering whether to do so, however, the Justices should 
take care to be mindful of the long and rich history of these rulings in 
constitutional law. 
 
435 For some preliminary thoughts on these topics, see generally Dan T. Coenen, Quiet-
Revolution Constitutional Rulings and the Future Work of Lawyers and Judges (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author). 
